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Chapter I
Introduction

This thesis seeks to study the development of the law of endowment of agricultural lands
in Mamluk Egypt, by contextualizing historically the fatwas related to these endowments. I argue
that, in light of the prevailing economic and social circumstances, legal development during this
era occurred as a response to the political, social and economic interests of the religious scholars
and of the ruling elite, and as a result of the interaction between the interests of the former and
power of the latter.
To achieve this goal, I will study the fatwas issued about endowments of agricultural
lands during the Mamluk era, as well as the social and economic circumstances surrounding their
issuance. I will also consider earlier writings on the subject in an attempt to identify how views
on the matter developed and the techniques used to achieve this development. This helps to have
a better understanding of both the law and the Mamluk economic history, since agricultural lands
were a major economic resource, both for the state and the Mamluk amirs.

“Waqf”: The term and the Institution:
In the Arabic language, the verb waqafa means “to stop or to block”.1 The legal definition
in Islamic law reflects the literal meaning, since the waqf is defined as “a prohibition to dispose of
the asset and benefit from its usufruct.” 2 It is important to note that the institution of waqf was not

1

Muḥammad Zubair ’Abbasi, “The Classical Islamic Law of Waqf: A Concise Introduction,” Arab Law Quarterly
26 (2012), 124.
2
Muhammad Abu Zahra, Muhadarat fi-l-Waqf (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-‘Arabi, 1972), 6, ’Abbasi, “The Classical
Islamic Law of Waqf,” 126.
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mentioned in the Quran, and therefore its governing rules have no divine origins. 1 This is possibly
one of the factors that facilitated the changes in the Waqf law.
The waqf is established through a deed, called “waqfiyya”, where the endower, called
waqif, endows one or more property that he or she owns, in favour of one or more beneficiaries
specified in the deed. By this operation, the waqif prohibits the sale, pledge, inheritance and any
kind of disposal of the endowed property, which should remain to serve the purpose of the waqf
and the beneficiaries perpetually. In the same deed, the endower nominates an administrator (called
mutawalli or nazir) for the waqf during his own life to manage the waqf according to the conditions
he set forth in the deed. The deed then provides for the means to appoint the administrator
following the endower’s death. 2
There is almost a consensus that pious endowments (awqaf, in singular waqf) were one of
the most important institutions in pre-modern Islamic societies. 3 Historians agree that awqaf
increased significantly in Mamluk Egypt. During that time, the establishment of an endowment
was, in the words of Adam Sabra, “the charitable act par excellence.” 4
This study is limited to the endowments of kharaj lands established through endowments
deeds (awqaf). It does not extend to similar institutions, namely, the rizaq (singular: rizqa). The
Rizaq were agricultural lands distributed for charity purposes by Sultans and were exempted
from taxes. These rizaq used to support mosques and religious institutions or some individuals
and their progeny.5 This type was called rizaq ihbasiyya, and were administered by diwan al-

1

’Abbasi, “The Classical Islamic Law of Waqf,” 124.
’Abbasi, “The Classical Islamic Law of Waqf,” 124 and 129, Adam Sabra, Poverty and Charity in Medieval Islam:
Mamluk Egypt, 1250-1517 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 70.
3
Claude Cahen, “Réflexions sur le Waqf ancien,” Studia Islamica 14 (1961), 37.
4
Adam Sabra, Poverty and Charity in Medieval Islam: Mamluk Egypt, 1250-1517 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), 70.
5
Nicolas Michel, “Les Rizaq Ihbasiyya, terres agricoles en mainmorte dans l’Égypte mamelouke et ottomane.
Études sur les Dafātir al-Aḥbās ottomans," Annales islamologiques 30 (1996), 111.
2
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ahbas. Another type of rizaq was distributed by diwan al-jaysh pursuant to a muraba‘ (decree) to
support former army officers who cannot perform their military duties or their widows and
progeny. These rizaq were called rizaq jayshiyya.1 The Mamluk administration distinguished
between the awqaf and the rizaq ihbasiyya, each of the two institutions was subject to a different
set of rules.2 Al-Maqrizi has classified the endowments (that he called awqaf) in a different
category than the rizaq (that he called ahbas).3 Nicolas Michel has correctly noticed that alMaqrizi avoided any reference to a legal or religious status of the rizaq, which shows that they
were different institutions in the eyes of the Mamluk chroniclers and administration. 4
Main Issues Raised by the Study:
The study of the fatwas related to endowment of agricultural lands in the Mamluk era in
their economic and social context to trace legal development raises, however, many issues that
should be studied and discussed in depth.
The first issue relates to the existence of a legal development, in light of the general
assumption among Islamic law scholars that the Mamluk era was the period of “commentaries
and super-commentaries” (al-shuruh wa-l-hawashi).5 This means that no innovation was possible
during this period, since fiqh treatises were limited to explaining and commenting on the writings
of earlier religious scholars.6 This view was challenged by other scholars. 7 Wael Hallaq, for

1

Muhammad Muhammad Amin, Al-Awqaf wa-l-Haya al-Ijtima‘iyya fi Misr (Cairo: Dar al-Nahda al-‘Arabiyya,
1980), 108-110, Nicolas Michel, “Les Rizaq Ihbasiyya,” 116.
2
Nicolas Michel, “Les Rizaq Ihbasiyya,” 115.
3
Taqi al-Din Ahmad Ibn ʿAli al-Maqrizi, Al-Mawaʿiz wa-al-Iʿtibar bi Dhikr al-Khitat wa-al-Athar (Al-Khitat alMaqriziyya), 3 vols. (Cairo: Maktabat Madbuly, 1998), 1:279.
4
Nicolas Michel, “Les Rizaq Ihbasiyya,” 116.
5
Matthew B. Ingalls, “The Historiography of Islamic Law During the Mamluk Sultanate,” in
The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Law, Ed. Anver M. Emon and Rumee Ahmed, 10, available at: DOI:
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199679010.013.66 , p. 10, accessed on 31 December 2018.
6
Matthew B. Ingalls, “Šarh, Ihtisār, and Late-Medieval Legal Change,” Annemarie Schimmel Kolleg Working Paper
17 (2014), 2.
7
Wael Hallaq, Authority, Continuity and Change in Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004);
Baber Johansen, Islamic Law on Land Tax and Rent: The Peasants' Loss of Property Rights as Interpreted in the
Hanafite Legal Literature of the Mamluk and Ottoman Periods (New York: Croom Helm, 1988).
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instance, attempted to study the techniques of the development of Islamic law, and, to a certain
extent, the impact of social groups on such development. He examined the various processes
which change of law could undertake.
Hallaq took the view that there were many processes of legal development. One of the
most important techniques is the “selective appropriation and the manipulation of earlier juristic
discourse”, which occurred within the same school. Scholars seem to repeat opinions of earlier
jurists, but in reality they selected some of these opinions, including minor views, to meet the
needs of these jurists’ times and the questions raised before them. This selection included an
exclusion of other opinions which did not meet the practical needs of the time. This, by itself,
contributed to the development of the law. 1
Development also occurred, in Hallaq’a view, through the incorporation of fatwas in
legal treaties, including those commenting or explaining earlier opinions. Hallaq argued that
responses to questions raised by individuals in the form of fatwas “played a considerable role in
the growth and gradual change of Islamic substantive law,” 2 because they emerged from social
reality “involving real people with real problems.” 3 The incorporation of these fatwas into the
substantive law handbooks by jurists led to a gradual development of the law based on real issues
originating in the social and economic context,4 not hypothetical cases invented by religious
scholars. In this study, I argue that the law of endowments of agricultural lands developed
gradually during the Mamluk era through these processes. I will attempt to show such

1

Hallaq, Authority, Continuity and Change in Islamic Law, 214-215
Wael Hallaq, “From Fatwas to Furu‘: Growth and Change in Islamic Substantive Law,” Islamic Law and Society
1.1 (1994): 29-65, 31.
3
Ibid., 38.
4
Wael Hallaq, Authority, Continuity and Change in Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004),
234.
2
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development by studying the fatwas issued regarding the establishment and the exchange of
endowment of agricultural lands and the circumstances surrounding their issuance.
To contextualize these fatwas, the agents behind this legal development must be studied.
Hallaq also studied the agents of the legal development: judges, muftis and author jurists, who
incorporated new fatwas in their writings, arguing that, starting from the second A.H/eighth C. E.
century, the muftis not the qadis were the real agents of legal development and change. 1 He
considered that the qadis were corrupt, because they were not independent from the political
ruling elites, while muftis could keep their independence. This is based on the fact that muftis did
not need the state to recognize them and that they auto-regulated their profession. Muftis’
positions were thus, in Hallaq’s words, “immune from government interference,” 2 while qadis
were appointed, paid and dismissed by rulers. 3 Qadis might have been involved in the process of
legal change by applying new or weak opinions of some schools, but the complete development
or evolution was made, according to Hallaq, through the “legitimization” of these opinions
through their adoption by muftis and then their final incorporation by jurist- consults into the law
books of the school.4
Contrary to Hallaq’s view, I argue that it is not entirely correct that muftis or jurists,
when issuing their opinions, were totally independent from the ruling elite. Such a view cannot
be automatically generalized and applied to all periods of Islamic history that followed the
second A.H/eighth century C.E. Jurists or religious scholar (the class of ulama) had many
interests that may have affected their opinions. They were not, as Amin argued, only driven by
corruption.

1

Hallaq, “From Fatwas to Furu‘,” 55.
Ibid., 59.
3
Ibid., 56-57.
4
Hallaq, Authority, Continuity and Change in Islamic Law, 234.
2
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I aim to demonstrate in this study that the ulama’s dependence on the allowances
originating in the revenues of the endowments supporting madrassas where they worked,
coupled with the general economic crisis during the fifteenth century and the scarcity of
revenues, had certainly an influence on some of their opinions relating to issues of endowments.
The second issue regarding the endowment of agricultural lands is the contradiction
between the expansion of endowment of these lands, specially starting from the end of the Bahri
period, and the agricultural crisis that is said to have started around the end of the 14 th century.
This crisis, coupled with depopulation resulting from the Black Death, led to a significant
decrease in agricultural productivity. How could the endowers increasingly endow agricultural
lands, while their revenues, necessary to support the foundations, were decreasing? This study
argues that accounts on the decline of agricultural productivity during the fifteenth century need
to be revisited and nuanced in light of the expansion of endowments of lands and the legal
techniques used to facilitate them. This issue will be explored in Chapter II of this study.
The third issue that faces the study of endowments of agricultural lands, is the legality of
the endowment of agricultural lands, the majority of which were, based on the prevailing view,
owned by Bayt al-mal, while lands hold privately (milk) were rare.1 Such endowment implies a
contradiction with the requirement of Islamic law that an endower should be the owner of the
endowed property. How were state-owned lands endowed? What were the legal mechanisms or
the basis of the legal opinions which validated the establishment of these endowments? I argue
that scholars during the Mamluk period adapted and reshaped some earlier theories in order to
allow either the sale of Bayt al-mal lands, or the endowment of Bayt al-mal properties directly

1

Imad Abu Ghazi’s Tatawur al-Hyaza al-Zira’iya fi Misr Zaman al-Mamalik al-Jarakisa: Dirasa fi Bay‘ Amlak
Bayt al-Mal (al-Jiza: ‘Ayn lil-Dirasat wa al-Buhuth al-Insaniyya wa-l-Ijtima‘iyya, 2000), 10.
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without purchase. These positions had many justifications, which will be studied in depth in
Chapter III of this thesis.
The fourth issue relates to the principle of the perpetuity of endowments. The majority of
the schools of law adopt the view that an endowment, to be valid, must be perpetual. 1 However,
various accounts and deeds showed the expansion of the exchange process, i.e. replacing the
endowed property with another one, especially during the 15 th century and during the last years
of the Mamluk Sultanate.2 How could religious scholars and judges legally justify exchange, in
light of the necessary perpetual character of endowments? In Chapter IV, I argue that scholars
allowed Istibdal in various forms to ensure the perpetuity of the endowments revenues. This
came as a response to many factors, including pressure from the ruling elite and the penetration
of commercial interests into the Waqf institution.
Secondary Literature Dealing with Endowments of Agricultural Lands:
The literature on Waqf is very large and touches numerous subjects. Historians used
Islamic endowments, especially endowments deeds, as a tool to understand various institutions
like schools and hospitals, as well as other urban, political, social and economic aspects of the
Mamluk history. To cite only few examples, the most comprehensive study in the field is
Muhammad Muhammad Amin’s Al-Awqaf wa-l-Ḥaya al-Ijtima‘iyya fi Misr,3 which dealt with
the influence and importance of endowments for various cultural and social services as well as
the political and economic aspects. Adam Sabra studied the social services provided through
endowments in Poverty and Charity in Medieval Islam: Mamluk Egypt, 1250-1517.4

1

Abu Zahra, Muhadarat fi-l-Waqf, 62-64.
Imad Abu Ghazi’s Tatawur al-Hyaza al-Zira’iya, 10.
3
Muhammad Muhammad Amin, Al-Awqaf wa-l-Haya al-Ijtima‘iyya fi Misr (Cairo: Dar al-Nahda al-‘Arabiyya,
1980).
4
Sabra, Poverty and Charity, 70.
2
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Endowments were also studied to trace the urban developments of Cairo. 1 Financial aspects of
the endowments and their use as a revenue-generating tool as well as a tool to control state
resources has been extensively studied by Carl Petry and Igarashi Daisuke. 2 Others studied
endowments as a political tool to gain influence and reinforce the power and authorities of the
Sultans,3 while fewer studies attempted to explore the role of endowments in the relationship
between urban and rural areas.4 Many studies also focused on specific endowment deeds. 5
The present thesis explores a different angle. None of these studies used endowments to
trace the development of the law, and none of them focused on endowments of agricultural lands
and the multiple problem thereof. It is true that a number of legal scholars studied the Islamic
law of endowments. However, works of jurisprudence focused on the theory of waqf in general,

1

To cite few examples, See, Sylvie Denoix, “A Mamluk Institution for Urbanization: The Waqf,” in The Cairo
Heritage: Essays in Honor of Laila Ali Ibrahim, ed. Doris Behrens-Abouseif (Cairo: The American University in
Cairo Press, 2000):191-202; Leonor Fernandes, “Istibdal: The Game of Exchange and Its Impact on the
Urbanization of Mamluk Cairo,” in The Cairo Heritage: Essays in Honor of Laila Ali Ibrahim, ed. Doris BehrensAbouseif (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2000): 203-222.
2
Carl F. Petry, "Waqf as an Instrument of Investment in the Mamluk Sultanate: Security vs. Profit?," in Slave Elites
in the Middle East and Africa: A Comparative Study, ed. Toru Miura and John Edward Philips (London: Kegan Paul
International, 2000), 99-115; "Fractionalized Estates in a Centralized Regime: The Holdings of al-Ashraf Qaytbay
and Qansuh al-Ghawri According to Their Waqf Deeds," Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient
41.1 (1998): 96-117, Protectors or Praetorians? The Last Mamluk Sultans and Egypt's Waning as a Great Power
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994); Igarashi Daisuke, "The Private Property and Awqaf of the
Circassian Mamluk Sultans: The Case of Barquq," Orient 43 (2008): 167-196, “The Establishment and
Development of al-Diwan al-Mufrad: Its Background and Implications,” Mamluk Studies Review 10.1 (2006): 117140, “Land Tenure and Mamluk Waqf,” Annemaire Schimmel Kolleg 7 (2014).
3
See, for instance, Randi Deguilhem (ed.). Le Waqf dans l'espace islamique. Outil de pouvoir socio-politique (Paris:
IFEAD Damas, Adrien Maisonneuve,1995), Muhammad Hafez Shaaban, Piety and Power: Pious Endowments in
the Baḥri Mamluk Period, 1250-1382, Unpublished M.A. Thesis submitted to the Department of Arab and Islamic
Civilizations, AUC, 2015.
4
Rudolf Vesely, "Procès de la production et rôle du waqf dans les relations ville-campagne," in Le Waqf dans
l'espace islamique. Outil de pouvoir socio-politique, ed. Randi Deguilhem (Paris: IFEAD Damas, Adrien
Maisonneuve,1995): 229-241, and for an study including also urban, political and economic aspects: Sylvie Denoix,
“Pour une exploitation d’ensemble d’un corpus: Les Waqfs Mamluk du Caire,” in Le Waqf dans l'espace islamique.
Outil de pouvoir socio-politique, ed. Randi Deguilhem (Paris: IFEAD Damas, Adrien Maisonneuve,1995): 29-44.
5
For instance, Hani Hamza, “Some Aspects of the Economic and Social Life of Ibn Taghribirdi Based on an
Examination of His Waqfīyah,” Mamluk Studies Review 12.1 (2008):139-172, Jean-Claude Garçin and Mustafa
Anwar Taher, “Les Waqfs d’une Madrasa du Caire au XVe siècle: Les proprietés urbaines de Gawhar Al-Lala, ”in
Le Waqf dans l'espace islamique. Outil de pouvoir socio-politique, 151-186; Claude Cahen and Mustafa Taher, “Un
ensemble de Waqfs du IXe/VXe siècle en Egypte: Les actes de Jawhar al-Lala,” Itiniraires d’Orient, Hommages a
Claude Cahen (1994), 309-324.
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but did not focus on the fatwas or practices during a specific era in order to contextualize them,
or to study the surrounding political, economic and social conditions that might have led to the
issuance of these opinions or the development of such practices. Those studies also did not focus
on a specific type of endowed property. They cited opinions of different schools of law on
specific issues like the establishment, administration and the beneficiaries of endowments,
referencing sources from different eras. These sources, including books on jurisprudence and
fatwas, were cited without considering the historical, economic and social contexts where they
were produced, and with little, if any, attempt to trace a change or a development that may have
occurred to the applicable legal rules. The most striking example of this trend is Muhammad Abu
Zahra’s important study titled: Muhadarat fi-l Waqf.1
Historians also gave less attention to the legal aspects of awqaf during this period,
especially the endowment of agricultural lands, despite the large involvement of ulama (religious
scholars) and judges in the processes of establishment of the endowments.
The most extensive examination of legal doctrine was made by Muhammad Muhammad
Amin in al-Awqaf wa-l-Ḥaya al-Ijtima‘iyya fi Misr.2
Amin started his introduction by criticizing the legal resources that dealt with endowments
because they only focus on the theoretical issues. These resources, according to Amin, are confined
to studying the legality of the endowments and conditions of their validity. 3 Amin studied the
position of early Islamic religious scholars regarding the definition and legality of endowments.
Some religious scholars denied the prohibition to sell, pledge, transfer the ownership or inherit the
endowed asset, for fear that this charitable institution be used to avoid the application of the

1

Muhammad Abu Zahra, Muhadarat fi-l-Waqf (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-‘Arabi, 1972).
Muhammad Muhammad Amin, Al-Awqaf wa-l-Haya al-Ijtima‘iyya fi Misr (Cairo: Dar al-Nahda al-‘Arabiyya,
1980).
3
Amin, Al-Awqaf , 2.
2
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inheritance rules and deprive some heirs of their parts provided for in the Quran. 1 Some famous
Iraqi religious scholars, including Abu Hanifa, denied the legality and enforceability (luzum) of
the endowments,2 while other scholars from the Hanafi school, including Abu Hanifa’s two most
prominent students Muhammad al-Shaybani and Abu Yusuf, defended their legality based on
endowments established by the Companions in Medina. 3
Amin also studied the legal opinions related to the beneficiaries of the endowments, since
some of the early religious scholars insisted that the beneficiaries must be the poor or any other
institution that is considered qurba (approaching to God), while others allowed any beneficiary
unless including such beneficiary amounts to a sin. 4 Amin generally cited resources from the early
Islamic scholars and from the Ottoman period, while rarely relying on sources from the Mamluk
period.5
Throughout his study, Amin mentioned several times opinions of religious scholars
modifying earlier opinions, allowing, for instance, endowment from state owned properties. 6 He
also pointed out to some religious scholars’ opinions issued to circumvent the application of the
terms of the Waqf deeds.7
However, Amin did not examine in detail these opinions nor did he offer explanations for
this change of positions of religious scholars, except, in some cases, the greed of the waqf
administrators.8

He also acknowledged that religious scholars benefited financially from

1

Amin, Al-Awqaf, 22-23.
Amin seems to use the two words of legality and enforceability interchangeably. The doctrine of nonenforceability of the endowment led to its annulment after the death of the endower, See, Amin, Al-Awqaf, 24-25
and 34.
3
Ibid., 26-27.
4
Ibid., 29-32.
5
Ibid., 22-23, note No. 5, where he mentioned al-Ṭarabulsi (d.1516)
6
Ibid., 95 and 277.
7
Ibid., 284.
8
Ibid., 284-385.
2
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endowments, since they occupied important positions in the foundations that the endowments
supported, either as instructors or administrators. 1 However, he did not make a link between the
ulama’s financial dependence on waqf and their opinions.
Without going into all the legal details related to the establishment of endowments, Adam
Sabra dealt in his Chapter titled “Waqf” with some legal issues raised by the endowment of the
state properties. Sabra claimed that awqaf were used in the tenth and eleventh centuries for political
purposes by rulers and public officials, who endowed lands owned by the state (Bayt al-Mal).
Sabra discussed the legal problems related to this type of endowment, mainly the ownership by
the endower of the endowed property.2 The solution found to this problem was to purchase the
property from Bayt al-Mal. Another “legal” solution was found by Shafi’i scholars who used the
notion of “Masalih al-Muslimin” (the interests of the Muslims) to allow Sultans to endow a stateowned property to fund a hospital or a school or any other institutions that benefited the population,
while prohibiting endowing state lands for the benefit of the Sultan’s offspring. 3
Accordingly, Sabra pointed out to the existence of legal problems raised by the endowment
of state-owned land, and mentioned briefly some of the mechanisms which responded to these
issues, without going into further details. He also pointed out briefly to the fiscal problems that
were created by the large number of endowments and their effect on the state’s solvency. 4
Carl Petry has also noticed some important legal issues, without, however, attempting to
discover their legal basis. For instance, Petry mentioned clearly that in spite of their perpetual

1

Ibid., 294-296.
Shaaban, Piety and Power, 4.
3
Sabra, Poverty and Charity, 71.
4
Ibid., 72.
2
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nature in theory, endowments were sold and exchanged, without further exploring the legal basis
for these actions.1
The exchange or Istibdal, a mechanism which also expanded during the Circassian Mamluk
period despite its rejection by important scholars, was also studied without focus on its legal basis
during this era. In Chapter II of his study titled al-Istibdal wa Ightisab al-Awqaf, Jamal Al-Khuli
examined the positions of the four schools of law and the main religious scholars regarding
Istibdal.2 With the exception of a case where he cited a Mamluk legal scholar who prohibited the
Istibdal entirely as a reaction to the Sultan’s abuse of the process, 3 al-Khuli did not specify the
social or economic circumstances surrounding these views. Nor was his focus on agricultural
lands. He mentioned tens of examples of the rulers’ interventions to confiscate or control the
endowments.4 With one exception related to the transformation and redistribution of rizaq
ihbassiya and other endowed lands into iqta‘ during al-Nasir Muhammad’s reign,5 all these
examples relate to urban properties, shops, houses and not agricultural lands, including the Istibdal
documents annexed to his study.6
Leonor Fernandes has also studied some legal aspects of the Istibdal process.7 Her main
focus was, however, the effect of this technique on the development of Cairo as an urban center.
Other secondary sources have noted, usually without any explanation, the problems raised
by endowments of agricultural lands. For example, Lucian Reinfandt has studied the family
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Cairo Heritage: Essays in Honor of Layla Ali Ibrahim, ed. Doris Behrens-Abouseif (Cairo: The American
University in Cairo Press, 2000): 203-222.
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endowment of al-Ashraf Inal, to which his son, al-Mu’ayad Ahmad, added many villages and
shares of villages located in Egypt and Syria.1 Reinfandt recognized clearly that these lands were
originally owned by Bayt al-mal, and detected, when possible, the means to acquire their property.
He also admitted that, despite the fact that these endowments were legally disputed, a Hanafi judge,
Sa‘d al-Din al-Muqadasi al-Dayri, validated them. Reinfandt suggested that the judge must have
been corrupt to accept the legality of these endowments,2 with no further comment.
Likewise, Yehoshua Frenkel studied three important Mamluk documents authored by
Taqi al-Din al-Maqrizi, Ibn Hajjar al-’Asqalani, and Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti. He referred to some
legal aspects related to endowments of agricultural lands in Egypt and Syria during the Mamluk
era, noting the illegality of transforming the lands granted as Iqta‘ into endowments, and the
legal debates surrounding the issue. He also pointed to the opposition of ulama who, despite
having doubts on the legality of many endowments, accepted positions in the endowed
establishments.3 Being limited to examine the circumstances surrounding the three documents he
studied, translated and edited (all related to the endowment allegedly granted by the Prophet to
Tamin al-Dari in Hebron), Frenkel did not provide further legal or social analysis to his
comments, nor did he try to explain the basis of the ulama’s position. 4
These two studies are examples of research about legal issues related to the endowment
of agricultural lands; however, these writings did not examine in detail the development of the
legal opinions during the Mamluk era, nor did they attempt to interpret them within their political
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and economic context. The general trend in many studies tended to interpret alteration in the
waqf system as a decline and reflection of corrupted regime, or a result of corrupted ulama.
For instance, Muhammad Amin justified attempts to dissolve or confiscate endowments
with the economic conditions and lack of resources needed to prepare war campaigns against
internal or external enemies. However, he suggested that the corruption of some of the judges
and ulama helped the Sultans achieve these goals. 1 He perceived Barquq’s and Qatbay’s attempts
to dissolve or confiscate endowments 2 as a decline and believed, like chronicles of the time, that
the position of the ulama who objected to their project was the right one because in conformity
with the law, while those who agreed with dissolution plans did it out of greed and hypocrisy. 3
These views on the greed and corruption of the ulama ignored the social and economic
context in which those ulama lived and its influence on their opinions. They did not take into
consideration the techniques that the ulama implemented to justify their positions, and the role
they played in the development of the law of endowments.
This study attempts to bring together the historical developments of endowments and the
development of the legal framework surrounding this institution in light of the economic
conditions, the status of land ownership, and the social and economic conditions of jurists under
the Mamluk state.
To achieve this, I will study the fatwas and opinions of Egyptian and Syrian scholars of the
14th and 15th centuries. First, because the Mamluk state was the largest Iqta’ state in the Middle
East during the medieval period,4 and second, because the Mamluk state witnessed the flourishing
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of the Waqf institution and was among the first states in the medieval period where endowments,
especially those of agricultural lands, underwent a major expansion. 1
There are a number of reasons why this study focuses on Egypt. Firstly, the Mamluk state
was the center of the Islamic world and the center of knowledge and law production during the
14th and the 15th centuries. Following the destruction of the Abbasid Caliphate and of other Islamic
states in Iran and Syria after the Mongols’ invasion and the fall of Spain, Egypt has become the
destination of scholars and intellectuals who lived in these areas. Cairo had thus became the center
of scientific and religious activities and knowledge production in the Islamic world. 2 It was also
the center where law was produced and studied. Accordingly, in order to understand how law
developed, scholars of the Mamluk state offer rich materials. Secondly, Egypt witnessed an
enormous expansion of endowments of agricultural lands during the Mamluk era, while lands were
a major source of state’s revenues. For these reasons, the study of how these factors interacted
provides rich grounds for research.
This study will mainly focus on the Shafi‘i and Hanafi schools of law. Despite the
appointment of four chief justices of the four schools of law by al-Zahir Baybars in 663/1265, 3
the Shafi‘i chief justice conserved his primacy in many aspects like the supervision of
endowments and of orphans monies. Some formal privileges were also reserved for the Shafi‘i
chief justice like the wearing of the tarha (veil) during the court sessions. 4 The Hanafi scholars
and judges also played an important role in advising Sultans. During the Circassian period, there
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were attempts to promote the Hanafi school and judges, the latter actually gained more power.
Many schools were founded to teach the Hanafi fiqh. Chronicles also noticed the favour of the
Circassian Sultans and the ruling elite since the late Bahri period to Hanafi scholars and judges,
especially those of foreign origin (Turk or Persian origin). 1 However, Shafi‘i scholars remained
the most preferred and influential, dominating religious and even bureaucratic functions until the
end of the Mamluk state.2 References will be made to the Hanbali school in the context of
Istibdal, since it had innovative views on which the operation of Istibdal may have relied during
the Bahri Mamluk period.
Sources:
Primary sources:
First, the most important primary sources used for this study are the writings of the
religious scholars who lived during the Mamluk era on endowments. I also studied earlier
important scholars who focused on endowments or on issues of the legal status of agricultural
lands, like al-Khassaf (d. 261 / 874) and Abu Yusuf Abu Yusuf (d. 182 / 798 ) to make comparisons
and trace existing legal development. Ibn Nujaym (926/1520-970/1563) who lived immediately
after the Mamluk period, was also be briefly examined, since he studied and commented on the
writings of the most important Mamluk scholars.
These writings are either treatises, collection of fatwas or rasa’il answering specific
questions or addressing specific issues. To cite some examples, Al-Suyuti’s (849/1445-911/ 1505)
fatwa-s gathered in al-Hawi lil Fatawi, including his famous risala titled Al-Insaf fi Tamyyiz al-
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Awqaf, Ibn al-Humam’s (790/1388- 861/-1457) Sharh Fath al-Qadir, and Al-Tarabulsi’s (853922/ 1449-1516) al-Is‘af fi Ahkam al-Awqaf.1
Even though this study focuses on Egypt, legal treatises of a number of Damascene scholars
were also studied, because they were extensively referred to by Egyptian scholars, and many of
them commented on the legal practice of judges in Egypt. Example of these are the Shafi‘i alNawawi and the Hanafi al-Tarsusi. Others, like al-Tarabulsi, were of Syrian origins, but moved to
Cairo and lived in Egypt. Their contribution to the development of the law on endowments during
the Mamluk period is extremely important, which shows the necessity to include them in a study
on the legal development in Mamluk Egypt.
The second source I used are the published endowment deeds, like the deed of al-Mansur
Qalawun dated 12 Saffar 685/ 9 April 1286, the deed of al-Nasir Muhammad dated 10 Jumada
al-Thani 724/ 28 May 1324, and the deed of al-Nasir Hassan made in 760/ 1359, all published by
Muhammad Muhammad Amin as annexes to Tadhkirat al-Nabih fi Ayam al-Mansur wa-Banih.2
They helped tracing the development of the endowment of agricultural lands, the means of their
acquisition by the endower, and some of the endower’s conditions, especially those related to
Istibdal.
Finally, chronicles were also used in this study. A special emphasis was made on alMaqrizi’s Suluk and Khitat,3 since they deal with many issues related to types of lands, the
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productivity of agricultural lands, and include in detail accounts of meetings held between the
rulers and the ulama.
Secondary Sources:
This study relied on a number of important secondary sources which studied religious
scholars, endowments, agriculture and landholding in the Mamluk era and early Ottoman periods.
These include Muhammad Muhammad Amin leading study titled al-Awqaf wa-l-Haya alIjtima‘iyya fi Misr, Imad Abu Ghazi’s Tatawur al-Hyaza al-Zira’iya fi Misr Zaman al-Mamalik
al-Jarakisa: Dirasa fi Bay‘ Amlak Bayt al-Mal. Carl Petry’s studies Protectors or Pretorians,
Civilian Elite of Cairo, and his leading studies on the endowments of Qaytbay and Al-Ghuri,
Daisuke Igarashi’s studies on Barquq’s endowments, T. Sato study titled State and Rural Society
in Medieval Islam: Sultans, Muqta‘s, and Fallahhun, Claude Cahen and Ibrahim Tarkhan
important studies about Iqta‘ were also relied upon extensively.1
This study is divided in four chapters. Following this introduction, a second chapter
includes a brief overview of the economic conditions during the Mamluk era, including agriculture
and land productivity, in order to detect the economic crisis that the Mamluk state faced during
the fifteenth century. I will also examine in this chapter the response of the Sultans and the ulama
to these conditions: the former trying to collect funds and accumulate wealth, while the latter were
trying to survive, keep their position and revenues. Endowments were used to achieve both
purposes. Chapter Three studies the landholding system prevailing in Mamluk Egypt, the legal
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status of the lands of Egypt and the legal basis of the endowment of agricultural lands in Mamluk
Egypt, in light of the prevailing doctrine that the majority of these lands were state-owned. Chapter
Four studies the technique of Istibdal, which was one of the means to circulate agricultural lands.
A conclusion then attempts to recapitulate the relationship between the land, the ruling elite and
the ulama, and its influence on the development of the law on endowments.
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Chapter II
The Mamluk Elite and the Ulama in a Changing Economic and Social Context

To understand the development of the endowments and the legal rules governing them, one
needs first to consider the surrounding economic and social circumstances that affected these
developments. This chapter attempts to contextualize the shift towards endowing agricultural lands
during the late Bahri and Circassian periods and to explain it. First, I will examine the general
economic conditions, including those of agriculture and irrigation. Then, responses to those
conditions by the ruling elite and the ulama will be studied, in order to justify the increase of
endowments of agricultural lands in Mamluk Egypt.
I-

Mamluk Economy and Agriculture: From Prosperity to Crisis?

There is a major contradiction in both primary and secondary sources related to the endowment
of agricultural lands. On the one hand, these sources consider that the irrigation and productivity
declined during the late 14th and the 15th centuries, in a context of a more general economic crisis,
on the other hand, the endowments of agricultural lands increased significantly, especially during
the 15th century. The following pages will attempt to tackle this contradiction.
This section will shed some light on the financial problems and the scarcity of resources
that the Mamluk Sultanate faced during the fifteenth century. An examination of this crisis is
necessary to understand the trend towards waqfization of agricultural lands, and its contradiction
with the decrease of agricultural production. This is to demonstrate that this crisis drove the
policy of Mamluk Sultans regarding endowments of agricultural lands. To face the shortage of
state funds, Mamluk Sultans’ primary aim was to find means to obtain funds and accumulate
wealth. Acquiring and endowing agricultural lands were among the most important tools to
realize this objective.
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The beginning of Mamluk era in Egypt was marked by military victories and economic
prosperity. Until before the Black Death in 1348, the first half of the fourteenth century
witnessed economic prosperity and commercial growth following the end of fifty years of war
against the Crusaders.1 Egypt became an important military and economic imperial power, 2 with
a growing population.3 Spice trade flourished through the Karimi merchants, carrying spices and
pepper between India, Yemen and Egypt, and leading to huge profits and flourishing of some
cities along their way, especially Qus in Upper Egypt. These merchants were also trading in
various goods like agricultural products, textiles, silk and sugar, but spice trade remained their
main activity.4
During the third reign of Al-Nasir Muhammad Ibn Qalawun (709-741/1310-1341), the state’s
revenues increased through many means, including increasing the Sultan’s personal Iqta’ (khass)
to 10 shares out of 24 shares of the lands, improvement of irrigation networks -- that we will
examine in the next section -- which led to an increase of agricultural productivity, the expansion
of sugar industry and trade, in which the Sultan, the emirs and important families were involved.
This resulted in an increase of the revenues from commercial taxes. 5 While many accounts label
this period as one of stability and economic prosperity, 6 others took the view that the so-called
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economic decline of the Mamluk state had its origin in the last ten years of al-Nasir Muhammad
reign.1 The large expenditures of al-Nasir Muhammad exceeding significantly the state’s
revenues led to a deficit that the Sultan attempted to heal through confiscation of properties,
levying heavy taxes on urban communities and traders, and forcing the latter to buy goods from
the government at exaggerated prices (the system known as Tarh).2 These conditions led to an
overall crisis reaching the population who suffered the consequences of the financial losses of
merchants, either because of the scarcity of products or of their high prices. Such conditions led,
in Levanoni’s view, to the ruin of many economic sectors in Egypt and in Syria. 3
The period which followed al-Nasir Muhammad’s death was a period of political
instability. Twelve Sultans ruled the Mamluk Empire until 1390. With the exception of al-Nasir
Hassan (748-752/ 1347-1351 and 755-762/1354-1361) and al-Ashraf Sha‘ban (764-778/13631377), none of these Sultans exercised real powers. 4 Economic conditions worsened following
the Black Death in 1348,5 which decreased Egypt’s population by percentages estimated between
two fifth at the minimum to 40% at the maximum.6 This, coupled with the policies of the Sultans
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and other external factors related to international trade, had a negative effect on industries and
agriculture. Many industries were in crisis including textiles 1 and sugar.2
To remedy for this lack of resources, Sultans searched for other means to obtain funds.
They had recourse to confiscations of properties and extortions, especially during the third reign
of al-Nasir Muhammad3 and al-Nasir Faraj (801-808/1389-1398 and 808-815/ 1405-1412). 4
These are only examples for a common practice.
Forced sales and purchases of the Sultans’ products at exaggerated prices occurred since
the third reign of al-Nasir Muhammad. State monopolies were instituted during Barsbay’s rule
(825-841/ 1422-1437).5 Monopolies were enforced on all types of trade including spices, sugar
and textile. The state’s monopoly regime was reported to have engendered enormous revenues,
to the detriment, however, to traders like the Karimis. This led to European traders forced to pay
customs in Cairo and purchase from Sultans to seek other routes for their trade, in order to avoid
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these complications and loss of money.1 Furthermore, monopoly policy resulted in the
weakening of the industries of textile and sugar, and a decline of the domestic purchases. 2 For
instance, Barsbay’s monopolies contributed to the end of privately owned sugar factories. 3 This
led to the existence of fewer factories at the beginning of the fifteenth century, a decrease of the
production, an increase of sugar prices due to the expensive and rare manpower following
plague outbreaks, and especially, in Ashtor’s view, the failure of the Mamluk government --now
in control of most of the factories-- to meet technological innovations. 4
Egypt also witnessed monetary crises because of debasement of the coins and the
shortage in heavy metals.5 The population, traders, peasants and even landholders suffered from
inflation.
To remedy to the state’s insolvency and the decrease of revenues, the Sultans turned to
agricultural lands, attempting to amass properties through endowing them. Agriculture provided
“the basic revenues funding the activities of the Mamluk elite.” 6 However, agriculture was not in
a better position than the rest of the economic activities. Despite the foregoing crisis, the
decrease in agricultural production was the most serious. Petry considered it as “the fundamental
cause of Egypt’s long range deterioration.”7 This crisis raises more issues about the reason of the
increase of endowments of agricultural lands during this era, because of the contradiction
between the expansion of land endowments and the decrease in their productivity.
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Agriculture
The importance of assessing the productivity of agricultural lands lies in its necessity to
understand the possible revenues an endower expected the lands he endows to generate. It also
helps studying whether the increase in endowments of agricultural lands rather than urban
properties had its reason in the better productivity of the lands that ensured the funding of the
foundations created by the endowment beneficiaries. Despite a lack of accuracy and scarcity of
sources, various accounts confirm the decreasing land productivity and the overall deterioration
of agricultural lands, diminishing, accordingly, revenues that a muqta‘ or an endower would have
expected the land to yield. Despite this decline, appropriation of the agricultural lands revenues,
even if they were decreasing, became an important source of revenues for the Mamluk ruling
elite. This section will shed some light on the agricultural crisis, in an attempt to explain the
paradox of expansion of endowments of lands.
An Agricultural Production in Crisis?
Al-Maqrizi reported that at the time of the Husami Rawk conducted in 1298, the’ibra of
the iqta‘at had decreased in comparison with the ’ibra1 generated by the lands at the time of alMansur Qalawun (678-689/1279-1290). While the amount of ’ibra during Qalawun’s reign
varied from a minimum of 10,000 Dirham to a maximum exceeding 30,000 Dirhams, this
amount was decreased at the time of the Husami rawk, to the extent that the maximum ’ibra
collected from lands was 20,000 Dirhams.2 This remark may be nuanced, since the report of the
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same events by Ibn Taghribardi leaves room to doubt that Lajin distributed low income lands on
ajnad al-Halqa, and not that there was a general phenomenon of decreased land productivity. 1
Interestingly, Tarkhan noted that decrease of the ’ibra was common following al-Nasir
Muhammad’s reign, because of the scarcity of manpower or the neglect in maintaining the
lands.2
Decrease of the revenues engendered by agricultural lands is very clear in Ibn al-Jay‘an’s
important book Al-Tuhfa al-Saniyya bi-Asma’ al-Bilad al-Misriyya written in 1478. Al-Tuhfa
included a list of all Egyptian agrarian lands as they figure in different villages, alongside the
amount of their ’ibra calculated in 777/1376, during the reign of al-Ashraf Sha‘ban Ibn Hussein
(r.764-778/1366-1377), and the decrease which followed, if any, at the time where al-Tuhfa is
written in 1478.3 Al-Tuhfa showed clearly that the ’ibra of an important number of agricultural
lands decreased significantly, many of them by 50 percent. The decrease in revenues was not
limited to a specific area, but we find lesser amounts of ’ibra in villages in Upper and Lower
Egypt and in Alexandria. Many of the lands whose ’ibra decreased were endowed.
For instance, in Lower Egypt (al-wajh al-bahri), and specifically in Qaliubiyya, the’ibra
of Shubrahars, composed of 1376 Feddans, decreased from 4800 Dinar to 2400 Dinar. These
lands, according to Ibn al-Jay‘an, “were in the name of the Mamluks, the Halqa, and now they
are amlak, awqaf and rizaq.”4 In the same governorate, Qaliubiyya, Ibn al-Jay‘an mentioned
Namun-al-Sidr and its surrounding. This is an area composed of 2190 Feddans, whose ’ibra
amounted to 9000 Dinars, then decreased by 50 percent in 791/1388-1399, while it is without
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’ibra at all in 824/ 1421. This land was for the Mamluk and the Halqa, and “now”, i.e. by 1478,
is an endowment of Amir Janbak al-Dawadar al-Ashrafi. 1 Ibn al-Jay‘an did not mention or
suggest any reason for the total absence of ’ibra that he reported, neither mentioned that the land
was destroyed. The question on how was this land endowed without engendering any ’ibra is
open. A.N, Poliak suggested that the ‘ibra of these lands might have increased, and this increase
was concealed by the muqta.2 Similar examples from Qaluibiyya and other areas are abundant. In
Sharqiyya, we find, among many others, the ’ibra of the nahia called al-Hakimiyya, composed
of 550 Feddans, amounted to 1400 Dinars, and then in 815/1412 it decreased to 700 Dinars. This
land was allocated as Iqta‘ and included rizaq.3 Another example from Sharqiyya is alRamlatain, an endowment of the Amir Sudun al-Shaykhuni composed of 378 feddans, whose
’ibra amounted to 1200 Dinars and decreased to 400 Dinars. 4 In Minufiyya, we find as example
al-Rahib, an estate amounting to 622 feddans, whose ’ibra reached 4000 Dinars and then
decreased to 2000 Dinars, and it included endowments.
In Upper Egypt, we may cite as examples, Manial ’Ayash, in Jiza, composed of 873
feddans, whose ’ibra was 2500 Dinars and then declined to 833 Dinars. This plot was an
endowment of al-Badri Ibn al-Wazir. Malawi, also in Upper Egypt, composed of 4870 feddans,
had a ‘ibra of 18000 Dinars, which decreased to 10000 Dinars. 5
The foregoing are only examples of decrease in the revenues of agricultural lands that Ibn
al-Jay‘an detected.
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This decrease in land productivity was caused by and coupled with the deterioration of
the irrigation systems and the depopulation of rural areas. 1 Those two phenomena are
interrelated since guaranteeing the proper operation of the irrigation system necessitated
manpower to maintain the dikes, the basins and the canals and to repair the dikes which the high
Nile flood is capable of destroying. 2 The responsibility for the maintenance and repair of the
dikes (and presumably the canals) was shared between the government and the muqta‘.3
In the early Mamluk period during the reign of al-Zahir Baybars (658-676/1259-1277),
al-Mansur Qalawun (678-689/1279-1290), and during the reign of al-Nasir Muhammad (693694/1293-1294; 698-707/1298-1308 and 709-741/1310-1341), the irrigation system functioned
properly. Large irrigation projects were established, including digging and maintenance of
canals, (in al-Buhayra 1284 and Alexandria in 1311, for instance) resulting in the increase of the
agricultural land in Egypt by fifty percent as well as an increase of the amount of kharaj.4
However, following the lack of resources, which started in the final years of al-Nasir
Muhammad’s reign, the following Sultans did not allocate enough resources to maintain
irrigation networks. They transferred their burden to the bureaucrats in the provinces, to the
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extent that most of the dams in Upper Egypt were damaged only three years following al-Nasir’s
death.1 According to al-Maqrizi, starting from the reign of Al-Nasir Faraj, funds which should
have been allocated to the maintenance and repair of the local dikes and canals, were collected
and delivered to the Sultan and distributed to his close Mamluks instead of being allocated to the
maintenance of jusur, in order to compensate the reduction of the landholders’ revenues. The
peasants were obliged to insure maintenance works through forced labour. 2
Most historians of the period detected the malfunctioning of the irrigation system,
especially of the Sultanic Jusur, because of the lack of maintenance. Accordingly, both canal and
dike systems deteriorated, which affected negatively the agriculture. 3
This led to the damaging and the decrease of arable lands, complicating further the
problems and contributing, with the elements already studied, to the decay in agricultural
productivity.4
Depopulation came to increase these problems. During the Black Death and the following
epidemics, rural areas witnessed a severe depopulation caused by high mortality rate on the one
hand, and by immigration of the surviving population to urban areas and to Cairo seeking
medical services and food reserves on the other hand.5 This resulted in a decline of agricultural
productivity and a decrease in the amount of kharaj.6
For instance, in 825/1422, al-Maqrizi reported that “You would walk for ten days in
Upper Egypt’s villages and you would find no one there”, and its lands are not cultivated.” 7
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Similarly, in 828/1425, al-Maqrizi reported that most of Egypt’s lands were “without
cultivation”, because of the low Nile flood, the neglect of the repair and construction of dikes. 1
In conclusion, the depopulation of the rural areas caused by plague outbreaks or flight,
the decay of irrigation systems, the debasement of the coin and the price increase, are elements
reported to have contributed to the decrease of agrarian productivity and general damage to
agriculture in Egypt in the mid of the 15th century.
Was there a Real Decrease in Land Productivity?
Despite this reported decline in agricultural productivity, endowments of agricultural
lands, and their prior purchase from Bayt al-mal, had increased significantly during the fifteenth
century.
Some views attempted to explain this paradox by suggesting that the muqta’s sought to
increase their landholding through endowment or appropriation of Bayt al-mal lands to
compensate their losses caused by the decrease in the revenues of their iqta‘.2 Another explanation
suggested that the decrease in the revenues generated by urban properties following the Black
Death caused a tendency towards endowing more agricultural lands to obtain more revenues. 3
These two suggestions are based on the premises that there was a decline in agricultural
production. However, I suggest that this may not have been the case.
First, the effect of depopulation on agriculture cannot be accurately assessed because of
the ambiguity surrounding the recovery from this effect following the Black Death. While some
scholars concluded that there was no recovery from depopulation because of recurrent plague
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outbreaks,1 others argued that, since the worse period of the Egyptian crisis was in the late 14 th
century and the beginning of the 15th century, it is not certain whether the decrease in agrarian
revenues was due to the crisis in irrigation systems and decimation of the population, or whether
it originated because of the decrease of the lands hold by the state and the increase of private
holdings or endowments.2 This argument means that it is possible that land productivity did not
decline, but there was a decrease in the state’s revenues from agricultural lands, because the
amount of lands controlled by the state diminished, or because of funds leaking.
Second, it seems very difficult to calculate the amount of the revenues generated by
agricultural lands in the absence of any cadastral survey, and in light of the variation of the price
of the Dinar Jayshi, the unit of calculation of the lands’ ‘ibra. Interestingly, in the beginning of
al-Tuhfa, Ibn al-Jay‘an stated clearly that even if the nominal amount of the ’ibra remained
unchanged, this does not mean that the lands generated the same revenues. The reason he cited is
the difference in the value of the Dinar Jayshi. Therefore, the amounts of ’ibra expressed in
Dinar Jayshi should be considered as a mere indication for the real value of the lands’ revenues,
because of “the passage of long time, and the deterioration of most of the villages and the change
of circumstances.”3
Third, as noticed by Poliak, al-Tuhfa only made reference to decrease in the lands’
revenues.4 Increase in the amount of ’ibra was never mentioned, because, as Poliak explained,
the muqta‘s concealed any increase in the revenues of their lands for fear that the Sultan takes it
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back and reduces their iqta‘.1 This is confirmed by the fact that the distribution of lands as iqta‘
(depending on the Mamluk rank in the army) was made on the basis of the land’s revenues, and
not through the allocation of a certain amount of Feddans for each rank. Thus, an increase in the
lands’ revenues would ultimately lead to the Sultan’s recovering the lands producing this surplus
to redistribute it to other members of the army. Accordingly, only the decrease in production
could be recorded or noticed, not the increase.
These factors raise many doubts as to the accuracy and the extent of this crisis in
agriculture. The expansion of endowments of agricultural lands, and the increase in the purchase
of lands from Bayt al-mal, add another argument to believe that the decline in agriculture
productivity was not as devastating as chronicles and historians suggest. This expansion came as
a response by the ruling elite to the economic conditions prevailing during the fifteenth century.
II-

One crisis, Different responses: Sultans and Ulama

Sultans and the Mamluk elite responded to the economic crisis of the fifteenth century briefly
explained above by accumulating wealth and increasing control over lands in order to compensate
the lack of state resources. This was accomplished by various means, the most relevant of which,
for the purpose of this study, was either the appropriation and then the endowment of agricultural
lands instead of commercial properties [Section A], or the dissolution of endowments and their
confiscation.. These mechanisms could not be implemented without an approval of the ulama. The
latter were in a difficult position: they tried to satisfy the sultans and the ruling elite, while at the
same time they had to preserve their revenues coming mainly from endowments. This difficult
position and the necessary relationship between the ulama, the sultans and the endowments, as
well as their reaction to the measures undertook by Sultans will be explored in section B.
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A- Pious Endowment: From Urban and Commercial Properties to Agricultural lands: A
Response to Economic and Political Crises
The establishment of endowments of agricultural lands was in reality opened to a limited
number of people. In addition to the Sultan, who could establish endowments from his own lands
(khass) or from the lands of Bayt al-mal, as will be shown in the next chapter, an individual had to
buy the land first from Bayt al-mal. However, this sale from Bayt al-mal properties was exceptional
and only permitted to the elite, like Mamluk amirs and important state officials. Nicolas Michel
estimated that, during the Mamluk era, persons who endowed agricultural lands were limited in
number, despite the large areas of lands endowed in each endowment. 1 Members of the Mamluk
elite purchased lands originally distributed as iqta’ or requested Sultanic approval to transform
iqta’ into rizaq, and then transformed them into endowments, in order to ensure revenues and
accumulate property, which led to the privatization of state owned lands through their
transformation into endowment.2
Endowing Agricultural Lands as a Response to Economic Crisis and Political Instability:
The increase of the endowments of agricultural lands aimed at generating more revenues
to face various economic and political crisis.3 For similar purposes, attempts at dissolving existing
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endowments also occurred. However, the decrease in agricultural lands productivity raises two
major questions that I will attempt to explore. First, how to justify the increase of endowments of
lands despite the decline of agricultural productivity and revenues? Second, what are the legal
basis for these actions in light of the state’s ownership of the lands? This section will examine the
former question, while the later will be studied in depth in Chapter III.
Historians acknowledged that the majority of endowments in Egypt before and at the
beginning of the Mamluk era were of commercial and urban nature, such as shops and houses. 1
Mamluk used endowments to gain “various forms of capital: political, economic and cultural.” 2
The late Bahri Mamluk period was the time that witnessed an increase in the endowment of
agricultural lands to finance other endowed institutions, especially following the death of al-Nasir
Muhammad in 741/1340. Endowed commercial properties supported the Qalawun complex and
the Madrasa of al-Nasir Muhammad while very little agricultural lands were endowed to fund
these institutions.3
Some historians took the view that there were political reasons rather than economic
reasons behind the alienation of iqta‘ lands to be transformed into waqf. Adam Sabra, for
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instance, claimed that there was no correlation between the dates of the economic crisis and
those of the sale of lands of Bayt al-mal and their endowments. 1 Sabra perceived this increase of
endowments as a change in the Mamluk elite and an attempt to secure resources for themselves
and their progeny through privatization of the state’s lands. The other reason was to prevent the
state from taking over these lands again, in light of the difficulty of dissolving endowments that
were made validly.2
For instance, the political complications that followed the death of al-Nasir Muhammad,
and continued during the two periods of al-Nasir Hassan 3 due to the conflicts between al-Nasir
Hassan’s and rival powerful amirs, like Baybugha Rus, Shaykhu, and Sarghatmash, led those amirs
to endow agricultural lands to have the funds necessary to face their rivals and reinforce their
position. This was accomplished through the alienation of lands they were granted as iqta‘ or
directly through endowing state-owned lands. These endowers appointed themselves as
administrators of waqf, and therefore could benefit from the revenues of the endowment either in
cash or in kind.4
As an illustration, Sarghatmash endowed for the benefit of his madrassa, in his deed of 27
Ramadan 757/ 9 September 1356, 529 Feddans in Mit Halfa near Cairo, 268 Feddans in Qaliub,
60 Feddans in Gharbiyya, 60 Islamic Feddans in Aleppo, and eight shares in another village in
Aleppo.5 Agricultural lands endowed by Sarghatmash exceed significantly, for instance, lands
endowed by al-Mansur Qalawun, which only amounted to 160 Feddans.6 This shows that the trend
towards endowing agricultural lands came in periods of internal conflicts, to help securing the
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necessary resources to combat rivals. It also shows that this trend resulted probably from the
redistribution of lands which followed the cadastral survey conducted in 1315 (the Nasiri rawk).
As I will show in the following section, this rawk resulted in the redistribution of smaller
parcels of lands as Iqta‘, since it increased the lands falling within the khass to ten shares instead
of four. This suggests that the muqta‘s wished to increase their revenues and their power by
appropriating more lands.
A second illustration are the endowments of large plots of lands made by Barquq (r. 784791/1382-1388 and 792-801/1389-1398), who acquired their ownership and endowed them either
when he was Atabak al-’asakar (779-784/1378-1382) or during his first or second reign. In many
instances, however, the means through which he acquired the endowed properties are not clear.
Through these large endowments, he sought to secure revenues for himself and to guarantee the
existence of necessary funds to purchase Mamluks, strengthen his throne, and finally to meet the
difficult political and financial crisis he faced. 1
A third illustration is the case of al-Ashraf Inal (r.858-865/1453-1460), who made a
charitable as well as a family endowment including large amounts of agricultural lands
purchased from Bayt al-mal, and comprised of shares in 20 Egyptian and Syrian villages. This
large endowment was justified by a desire to maintain the rule within his progeny by securing
financial resources for them, which might ultimately lead to the foundation of a ruling dynasty. 2
These plans did not succeed. Al-Mu’ayad Ahmed, Inal’s son, remained a short period in power,
(only 80 days) before being deposed by Khushqadam. However, despite this short period in
power, and immediately upon accession to throne in 865/1461, Al-Mu’ayad Ahmed purchased
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shares into at least 37 Egyptian and Syrian villages and added them to his father’s family
endowment. Such endowment also aimed at generating the revenues necessary for al-Mu’ayad
Ahmed to gain supporters and remain on the throne.1
One of the main reasons why there was a shift towards endowment of agricultural lands
is the fact that endowing the lands turned a transitory iqta‘ income into a permanent waqf one.2
Endowers were able to keep the lands under their control for the benefit of their descendants.
Endowments in general generated important revenues that benefited the endower’s family,
especially in light of what studies have showed about the significant discrepancies between the
income and the expenditures of many endowments, which means that endowments, including
those of agricultural lands, realized profits that would ultimately benefit the endower’s progeny
or beneficiaries.3
Other economic reasons were suggsted for the increase in the endowment of agricultural
lands in particular. First, decrease in the rental value of the urban property: this was the result of
the depopulation which followed the Black Death, resulting in a rise in wages and prices, and
scarcity in food. The revenues originating from this type of property then diminished; therefore,
less amounts were delivered to the beneficiaries of the endowments. This may have caused the
tendency towards endowing more agricultural lands, as opposed to urban properties. 4 This
justification seems to be hard to conciliate with what is known about the decrease in the production
of agricultural lands, due, inter alia, to the depopulation following the Black Death. 5
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Secondly, Daisuke Igarashi also suggested that the decrease of agricultural productivity
following the Black Death made the muqtas revenues of their iqta‘ insufficient. Therefore, they
sought to increase their landholding through irregular methods, taking advantage of the political
instability that followed the death of Sultan al-Nasir Hassan in 762/1361. 1
Another explanation was suggested for the same phenomenon towards the end of the
Mamluk period. In his book Protectors or Praetorians? The Last Mamluk Sultans and Egypt's
Waning as a Great Power, Carl Petry explained the trend of Qaytbay and al-Ghuri to endow large
properties, including rural properties located all over Egypt, “from Aswan to the Delta,” 2 as a
“financial strategy,” to secure financial resources for a private reserve, which he called “the
Sultan’s personal fisc.”3 According to Petry’s estimation, the expected revenues of some of these
endowments, urban properties and agricultural lands included, exceeded significantly the expenses
of the institutions they supported. For instance, expenses of some of the institutions established by
Qaytbay represented only 7 % or 14 % at maximum of the revenues. The distribution of the rest
of the revenues was not mentioned in the deeds, an omission which Petry believed to be made on
purpose. Since it is not clear whether Qaytbay family benefited from these extras, Petry suggested
that it flowed into the Sultan’s personal fisc. 4 A similar figure of 7 % of the revenues allocated as
expenses was calculated for al-Ghuri’s endowments, with the same omission in the Waqf deeds as
to the beneficiary of this extra amount (a small amount was allocated to the family). Petry reached
the same conclusion, that the surplus was allocated to a private fisc controlled by the Sultan: 5
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“Al-Ghuri’s waqf manipulations thus point to his conception of the pious foundation as a
secure depository above all else, a kind of bank in an age ignorant of the concept.” 1
Petry also suggested that al-Ghuri wished to put an end to the iqta‘ system: Endowment of
agricultural lands and converting of iqta‘ into endowments resulted in decreasing the properties of
Diwan al-Jaysh and led to a privatization of the state-owned lands. This, coupled with the
formation of a fifth Corps in the army to be paid in cash and not through the allocation of iqta‘,
shows that it might have been al-Ghuri’s policy to put an end to the iqta‘ system by adopting this
policy of endowing iqta‘ lands originally owned by the state and therefore privatizing them.2
The legal mechanisms through which iqta‘ lands were acquired and endowed by Sultans
were not clear, the deeds being silent on the issue. Petry suggested that plots of lands endowed
by al-Ghuri in Egypt and Palestine were “alienated from iqta‘ allotments” and “acquired via a
separate procedure undocumented beyond chronicles’ allusions.” 3 Ibn Kathir spoke of a
“collusion of religious officials” in order to implement the Sultan’s purposes in endowing state
owned lands.4
This increase of the endowments of agricultural lands was coupled with various attempts
at dissolving existing endowments, to be able to make use of the endowed lands, by selling or reendowing them. Those attempts showed the tensions that between the ulama and the Sultans.

B- The Ulama, the Ruling Elite and Endowments
The ulama were in a complex position: On the one hand, they sought to satisfy the
Mamluk ruling elite in order to guarantee their support and keep their teaching and judgeship
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positions. On the other hand, they wished to keep for themselves and their families an important
--or the most important-- source of income: the endowments, to survive the ongoing economic
crisis.
In the following sections, I will shed more light on the ulama’s paradoxical position. I argue
that, contrary to Hallaq’s view, the ulama or jurists were not independent agents of legal
development. Even if the jurists were not always under the direct control of the ruling elite for
their appointments and removal like judges, other economic and social factors affected their
positions regarding endowments. I also argue that the ulama’s position was not led by corruption
and hypocrisy, as suggested by some scholars. 1 Their position was influenced by their economic
need for the support of the ruling elite to maintain and increase their revenues from endowments.
Many scholars held, simultaneously, professorship and judgeship positions, and had interests in
keeping both positions and secure them for their progeny. Their own interests, affected by the
economic crisis and scarcity of revenues contributed to shape the development of the law of
endowments during the Mamluk era. These interests will be explored and studied in the following
section.
The ulama in Islamic history are those who possess the knowledge of Quran, the Hadith
or the prophet’s sayings, exegesis, and most importantly, Islamic law or fiqh.2 It is difficult to
consider the ulama as one coherent class because of the economic and social differences between
them. Some of the ulama formed a “religious elite” who occupied important positions, like
judgeship and professorships.3 Few of them held multiple state positions and gained fame and
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wealth, the majority were poor, underpaid, and worked in poor madrassas or in book copying,
reciting Quran and prayers.1
Ulama specialized in Islamic law (jurists), occupied two types of positions: judgeship and
professorship. The appointment to these positions as well as the remuneration they obtained
thereof depended on many factors including their close connection with the Mamluk ruling elite
and on the revenues of endowments. I assume that these factors had an influence on the opinions
that the Ulama issued, especially when their views were sought by Sultans or other powerful
emirs.
Ulama and Judgeship
Judges depended on the ruling elite for their appointment, dismissal and remuneration.
This position had certainly influenced their opinions in many important issues raised by the
ruling elite, including endowments and landholding.
Judgeship was the highest position to which ulama aspired. Judges were considered to be
“the voice of the ulama.”2 Judges in Egypt were paid by the State since the Fatimids. The latter
established many precedents related to the status of the judges, the most important, for the
purposes of this research, is the fact that they paid the qadis and other religious officials (like
Quran reciters and mu’azins) from the state’s treasury. The conduct of the Fatimids, influenced
the Mamluks to some extent.3
Judges also obtained revenues from the supervision of endowments. Shafi‘i judges were
responsible to oversee the endowments and mosques, until Sultan al-Zahir Baybars decided to
appoint four chief justices, one for each school of law. A new system for the management of
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endowments was implemented, where only charitable endowments (as opposed to family
endowments and the rizaq) remained under the supervision of the Shafi‘i chief judge. 1 Revenues
of these charitable endowments were kept with the Shafi‘i chief justice, who controlled their
distribution. The Shafi‘i chief justice, as well as the supervisors of endowments obtained a
remuneration from the revenues of the endowments under their supervision. However, some
judges are reported to have waived their remuneration, like Jalal al-Din al-Bulqini. 2
The fact that appointments to senior judgeship positions, entailing important
remunerations, were based on the choice of the Sultan or the recommendation of amirs means
that jurists and family of jurists had to keep good relationship with the ruling elite and should not
oppose them by any unfavourable opinion or decision. The chief justices had to be involved into
Mamluk politics and to keep a relationship with the Sultan and members of the Mamluk elite. 3
Furthermore, supervising the charitable endowments and obtaining remuneration from
their revenues, made the control of endowments and their continuity an important issue to
guarantee the income they generated.
Judges had also an interest in family endowments, since they were often appointed either
as Waqf administrator, or were entrusted with teaching and preaching in madrassas or
mausoleum established by the endowment deeds. 4
This is why many judges refused to dissolve endowments, despite the fact that this was
contrary to the ruler’s will.
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Many chief justices were subject to pressure from Sultans in order to issue opinions
legitimizing their arbitrary political decisions. If they refused, dismissal of their position was the
immediate response, in addition to arrest, torture and confiscation of properties in some cases. 1
The case of Abu al-Baqa’ al-Subki (born in 707/1307 and died in 777/1375) is an example of the
foregoing. Abu al-Baqaa was appointed chief Shafi’i justice in Cairo, and was requested by alAshraf Sha‘ban to annul an endowment to enable the Sultan to purchase the endowed house
(house of Kutbugha). Abu al-Baqa’ refused, and the Sultan dismissed him in 773/ 1372 and
ordered him to remain at his house.2
Other judges, however, tried to find a middle way by ensuring the continuity of
endowments of the ulama, while allowing the rulers to dissolve other endowments. This is the
case of Siraj al-Din al-Bulqini, that I will examine in the following chapter.
Ulama were not only under the pressure of the ruling elite because of their position as
judges, but also because of their position as professors.

Ulama as professors:
Teaching in educational institutions was also an important profession for the ulama,
either as mudaris or Sheikh.3 Knowledge and positions related to it were one important means for
social mobility, especially that these positions were very much respectable in Islamic societies. 4
Madrassas were educational institutions established by endowments deeds and funded,
administrated and managed according to the will of the endower as expressed in the deed.
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Madrassas were therefore “based on the law of Waqf”.1 Fiqh or Islamic law was the discipline
that was extensively taught in madrassas.
It is clear, therefore, that the ulama had an interest both in continuing the endowments
which supported the madrassas and ensuring that they hold many teaching positions in these
establishments. This might have led to a certain dependence of the ulama on the elite. There was
also a struggle between Ulama to obtain professorship at the madrassas. 2
Sources of income of professors:
During the early Islamic period professors were paid by students who agreed with them
on the amounts to be paid for their lessons. After the establishment of fully funded educational
institutions (during the Seljuk period), some professors were also still paid by the students, until
the fifteenth century. However, for some famous religious scholars (like al-Ghazzali) receiving
payments from students for teaching them religious sciences was forbidden religiously. 3
During the Ayyubid period, ulama also received salaries from the Caliphs/ state directly.
Some of them, however, refused these pensions or gave them to the poor or to their students, in
order to preserve their independence vis-a-vis the Caliph.4
This was not the case during the Mamluk period, since the ulama did not receive pensions
from the Sultan or the state, which affected their opinions as to the legitimacy of receiving
stipends from madrassas and some type of endowments. Accordingly, salaries from
professorship positions at madrassas were an important source of income for them. However,
these sources were insufficient, this is why some ulama abused them, either through
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embezzlements of the endowments revenues (if they were also responsible for administration) or
through holding many positions to gain their salaries. Since they were not able to teach in all of
them, ulama holding many positions appointed a substitute deputy to teach in their place. 1
These stipends paid to professors in madrassas originated in revenues of endowments. In
his Khitat, al-Maqrizi, described a number of 73 madrassas which existed in Cairo during his
lifetime, whether established during the Mamluk reign or before it. Among these madrassas, alMaqrizi mentioned expressly 17 of them which were funded through endowments. For most of
these, the type of the endowed property was not mentioned, except for 4 madrassas, which
include agricultural lands as source of their revenues.2

Multiplicity of Positions:
The dependence of the ulama’ s revenues on endowments and their interest in keeping
good relationship with the ruling elite to secure their positions were further affirmed by the fact
that many judges held teaching position at madrassas simultaneously with chief justice
positions.3 Scholars of the same family also inherited some teaching positions at important
madrassas.4 The ulama thus sought, through preserving their relationship with the ruling elite, to
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secure the positions for their progeny. In both their capacity as scholars and judges, they also
contributed to the development of Islamic law. 1
In his list of madrassas, al-Maqrizi mentioned some details about the jurists entrusted
with teaching positions therein. For instance, Siraj al-Din Umar Ibn al-Mulaqin (723-804/13231401), famous Shafi‘i judge and scholar, was teaching at the Madrassa al-Sabiqiyya and the
Madrassa al-Baqriyya.2 The famous Ibn Hajjar al-‘Asqalani (773-852/1371-1449) held more
than a dozen professorship positions in various madrassas. 3
The example of the Bulqini family is a typical example of long standing relationships
with the ruling elite, and a direct and continuing interest in the endowments. Keeping this
important source of wealth can explain, at least partially, their attitude towards endowments.
This family is an illustration of the complex relationship between one of the most
prominent judicial and scholar families and the Mamluk elite. Members of this family held all
types of legal positions: deputy judges, chief justices, endowments’ administrators and
supervisors, and professor in important madrassas. Siraj Umar al-Bulqini’s (who was a mufti in
Dar al-‘Adl and chief justice of Damascus but never got the position at the capital) progeny
dominated, over six generations, judgeship and professorship positions in Cairo and Damascus. 4
His first son, Jalal al-Din ‘Abd al-Rahman encouraged by his father who certified (ajazahu)
him to be a mufti, exerted efforts to be appointed judge in 804/1401 through the payment of a sum
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of money and through his relationship with the amir Sudun Taz. He remained judge until his death,
except for some periods where other judges were appointed for short terms. When he was removed
from office, he used his connections with members of the Mamluk elite, namely al-Nasiri Ibn alBarizi, Katib al-Sir, to be allowed to attend the sessions of the reading of Sahih al-Bukhari at the
Citadel in presence of Sultan al-Mu’ayad, where he attempted to show his knowledge and
undermine the judge who replaced him as chief justice. He also used his connections to get
appointments to positions where he controlled important endowments. He even paid to obtain such
positions in some instances, according to al-Sakhawi,1 while there is no evidence of embezzlement
of the endowments’ funds according to Petry. 2 His brother, ‘Alam Salih (died in 869/1464) also
had connections with powerful amirs and taught in his brother’s place after his death, and then
became Shafi’i chief justice in 826/1423. He remained a short period then he was dismissed and
reappointed many times-seven times the total of which is 13 years and half. 3 These two sons of
Siraj al-Bulqini held collectively around 15 professorship positions in important educational
institutions.4
Siraj al-Din’s grandsons also inherited positions and connections. Two sons of ‘Abd alRahman and three sons of ‘Alam Salih were all judges and maintained important professorship
positions. ‘Abd Al-Rahman’s elder son, Muhammad (787 -855/1385-1451) became deputy judge
of his father, mufti at Dar al-‘Adl, and taught with his brother, Qassim, following their father’s
death, exegesis in Ibn Tulun mosque. The two brothers also administered endowments of al-Sayfi
and al-Taqji. Muhammad

administered alone (as Nazir) other endowments including the
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endowment of Biblik al-Khazindari and Atabik al-Uzi and other endowments. 1 Al Sakhawi
mentioned that Muhammad refused to hold the chief justice position. 2 Apparently, he had enough
income from the administration of endowments and became very wealthy. 3 Qassim, (795861/1393-1457) also served as deputy judge and taught at pretigious schools (madrassa alZimamiyya and al-Nasiriyya). However, despite his attempts to make connections with the ruling
elite

in order to be appointed as Shaf’i chief justice,

he failed to get the appointment.

Nevertheless, he secured for himslef some revenue generating positions, such as nazir al-jawali
and the military judgeship.4 In al-Maqrizi’s Khitat, the Bulqini family was mentioned a number of
times, because its members were appointed to many teaching positions. 5
Despite the fact that this example relates to well known families and wealthy ulama who
do not represent the entire ulama class, those well connected and famous scholars were those
who were consulted by the elite on issues of endowments and who actually contributed to the
making and development of the law.
Nonetheless, ulama suffering from economic conditions were also present, and were able
to influence the fatwas related to endowments.
As a result, some fatwas allowed the holding of many positions by the same person and
delegating their teaching tasks to deputies while getting their stipends, contrary to the opinions of
earlier scholars of the same Shafi‘i school.6 Al-Suyuti’s ’Insaf is one of the best examples of a
treatise which gave priority to the interests of the scholars in getting paid by the revenues of the
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endowments before Sufis or students, and regardless of the terms of the endowment deed, as
long as the endowment originated in public funds or was a public waqf. Al-Suyuti considered,
therefore, that the payment they get is not a salary for teaching, but rather grants for jurists for
the mere fact that they are scholars.1
Many ulama during the fifteenth century complained from the insufficiency of their
revenues. They criticized the increase of endowments made for the fame of the endowers from
public funds and the concentration of the state revenues in the hands of the Mamluks who earned
more than ulama, while the latter were in need. 2 Taj al-Din al-Subki (d. 771/1370), the son of
the famous Taqi al-Din), for instance, blamed the Mamluk Sultans for the poverty of the ulama.
Not only were they not paid directly from Bayt al-Mal, their revenues from endowments were
threatened by the Sultans’s dissolution or confiscation of these endowments. 3 It is to be noted
that Taj al-Din inherited from his father, Taqi al-Din al-Subki, the position of chief justice of
Damascus and other professorship positions.4
This shows the paradoxical positions of the ulama: they stood against the dissolution of
the endowments according to the teachings of their school to maintain their revenues, while
accepting violations of the endower’s conditions in some cases, again to be able to accumulate
revenues and survive the economic crisis. Meanwhile, they had to keep a positive relationship
with the ruling elite or powerful amirs, which was a crucial criterion in their appointments to
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various teaching positions and to endowments’ supervision or administration positions. This was
an efficient tool to control the ulama.1
This is further demonstrated by historians’ comments on the ulama’s independence from
the state or the ruling elite. According to Winter, only few ulama were truly independent and
criticized openly the Sultans and their politics regarding taxes, monopolies, confiscations and the
luxurious lifestyle of Mamluk amirs compared to the poverty of the population. Those who
criticized Mamluks were oppressed because of their opposing positions. He cites, for instance,
Ibn Taymiyya and his disciple Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, while Ibn Jama‘a was cited as the
scholar who was on good terms with the rulers and sought to legitimize their rule, opining that
the population owed them obedience. 2
Other examples of independence may be observed in instances where the Sultans
gathered the ulama and Qadis to seek their opinions regarding the proper action to take to face
plagues and other problems like scarcity of rain and the low Nile flood. In these instances, some
ulama managed to preserve their independence and were able to express opinions which were
contrary to a Sultan’s economic policies (like Barsbay) or to advise Sultans to stop all forbidden
behaviour and prevent the committed by the population.3
Despite these examples, independence from the Sultan was not the rule. In short, Wael
Hallaq’s view that the jurists were “independent agents of legal change” does not reflect the
complexity of the situation.
The influence of this economic crisis and the ulama’s reaction to it can be detected in
their opinions related to the establishment of endowments.
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Chapter III
The Law and the Land: Land Ownership and Establishment of Endowments of
Agricultural Lands
Endowments of lands were subject to a different legal treatment in the Mamluk era. This
different treatment was not based on entirely new ideas, but rather on the selection of ideas of
earlier scholars and their adoption to accommodate the needs of the Mamluk state in the context
of the prevailing economic, social and political circumstances.
As previously examined, the dire economic conditions, the lack of state’s funds and the
need to regain control over state lands to maximize revenues as well as the will to secure
revenues for the Mamluk elite’s progeny were the reasons suggested behind the expansion of the
endowments, including those of agricultural lands. The issue that Mamluk rulers faced is that
lands of Egypt were the state’s property. The ruling elite did not own these lands, iqta‘ only gave
them usufruct rights. However, according to Islamic law, a valid endowment of a land should be
made by its owner.
On the other hand, religious scholars had also an interest to ensure firstly the continuity
of their revenues through endowments and secondly to gain the rulers’ support. They had to find
a legal solution for this paradox. It is in this context, I argue, that the endowments law developed
through processes that Hallaq called “selective appropriation and manipulation of earlier juristic
discourse,” in order to accommodate the needs of the endowers and the beneficiaries of
endowments during the Mamluk period. They could thus keep within the legal framework while
finding solutions for the issues they faced.
In this chapter, I will first study the prevailing landholding system in the Mamluk state
and whether it allowed individuals to own agricultural lands as private property (milk). Second, I
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will study the legal status of Egypt’s lands following the Islamic conquest. I will then move to
study the process of endowing agricultural lands, which necessitated, to be valid, an adaptation
and selection of earlier legal opinions on land ownership. This adaptation was necessary to
justify the state’s ownership of lands at a first stage, and then to have legal maneuvers to validate
the endowment of state’s owned lands under different names in a second stage. Religious
scholars attempted to find a practical solution for the lands to “fit” within the legal requirements
of a valid endowment. In order to trace the development, I will also study briefly the most
relevant opinions of scholars before the Mamluk period.
Iqta‘ and milk:
To better understand the legal issues related to endowments of agricultural land in the
Mamluk era, some light should be shed on the prevailing landholding system during this time, to
assess whether the requirement of ownership by the endower was satisfied in the lands that he
planned to endow.
Under the Mamluk system, the state was the main owner of agricultural lands, while a
very small portion of lands were owned privately by individuals (milk).1
This idea is reflected in the work of al-Maqrizi, who divided lands in the Mamluk period
into seven categories. Apart from the lands owned by the diwan, including those of Diwan alKhass and Diwan al-mufrad, and the rizaq, lands were allocated as Iqta‘ to the amirs and
members of the Mamluk armies. Al-Maqrizi mentioned the lands endowed for the benefit of
mosques, madrassas, Sufi lodges and for charity purposes, as well as family endowments. The
fifth type that al-Maqrizi mentioned was labeled as “milk.” These were lands which were
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privately owned and could be sold or inherited by the owners. The only means al-Maqrizi
mentioned to obtain the property of these lands was the purchase from Bayt al-mal. 1
Accordingly, endowing agricultural lands was problematic, because becoming the owner
of the land was a not an easy process. An individual had to buy the land first from Bayt al-mal.
However, this purchase was exceptional and only allowed to the elite, like Mamluk amirs and
important state officials. Nicolas Michel estimated that persons endowing agricultural lands were
few in number, despite the large areas of lands endowed in each endowment. 2 According to the
cadastral survey made under al-Nassir Muhammad (al-rawk al-Nasiri) in 1315, there was very
small portions of lands privately owned (milk) in Egypt in the late Middle Age. Most of the lands
were owned by the Royal Reserve (Khass and Diwad al-Mufrad), the Army Bureau (Diwan alJaysh), or awqaf.3 According to the same surveys, military officers owned the majority of these
privately owned lands and civilian landlords were rare. Peasants appeared as tenants. 4 The
difficulty or even the impossibility of owning agricultural lands was one of the factors why iqta’
played an important role in this era, which affected the endowment law.
Iqta‘, rather than private ownership, was the common landholding mechanism in Egypt
during the Mamluk era. Sultans attempted to guarantee the loyalty and obedience of the Mamluk
through distribution of lands. The lands should thus remain in the state’s or the Sultan’s control.
The Iqta‘ system should, in principle, guarantee this control.
The Iqta‘ as a landholding system started in Egypt during the Ayubid period, but
reached its peak during the Mamluk Sultanate.5 It is defined as “a concession of the tax revenues
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of the land” to serve as payment for the beneficiary of the Iqta‘, called muqta‘, for his military
services1 as well as the purchase, training and payment of his own Mamluks, expected to
perform military service upon call. Accordingly, this landholding system served two purposes:
ensuring the cultivation of the lands through the landholders (muqta‘s) and paying the Mamluk
army soldiers through the revenues of the lands they hold.
The majority of Iqta‘s in the Mamluk era only granted the muqta‘ a usufruct right
without an ownership of the lands.2 Some authors mentioned examples of Iqta‘ which transferred
the ownership of the land to the Muqta‘ , called Iqta‘ tamlik.3 This was exceptional, and the rule
was the usufruct Iqta‘, which could not, in theory, be inherited or sold, preventing, therefore, the
formation of land estates,4 and ensuring the state control over lands and landholders at all times.
According to A.N. Poliak, in the early Mamluk state, lands granted as iqta‘ were inherited or
sold. However, it is clear that this inheritance or sale were only limited to the usufruct rights,
since this acquisition through sale or inheritance was conditioned upon the performance by the
landholders of military services: the land was taken back by the Sultan if the holders, including
heirs or purchasers, were not able to perform military service. 5
Endowing of iqta‘was therefore legally problematic. Since Iqta‘ lands were not privately
owned, they could not legally be transformed into Waqf.
The holders of Iqta‘ were essentially members of the Mamluk army: the Sultan, the
amirs, the soldiers and Ajnad-al-Halqa.6 Some civilians also were allocated Iqta‘, but this was
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exceptional. Those civilians were basically the Caliph, some religious scholars and a few
manufacturers.1
The iqta‘ could be a source of wealth for its holders. The distribution of the lands
depended on the military rank of the Mamluk,2 the highest rank should be given, at least in
theory, lands with the highest revenues,3 since they were responsible for the purchase, training
and payment of a higher number of Mamluks to be ready to participate in combat upon call. 4
Sultans distributed or redistributed the Iqta‘ usually when they took office. However, rulers may
find themselves obliged to reconsider the Iqta‘ allocation to face some economic or social
conditions, to gain support, or to regain control over the lands.
To affirm or regain their control over lands, and to stop the transfer of the usufruct rights
of the iqta‘ to muqta‘ heirs,5 Sultans rrsorted to cadastral surveys known as rawk.6 Mamluk
Egypt witnessed two major cadastral surveys. The first was al-rawk al-Husami, conducted
during Husam al-Din Lajin’s reign in 1298.7 The second was al-rawk al-Nasiri, made in Egypt in
1315 and ended in 1316 during the third reign of al-Nasir Muhammad (1310-1340). The latest
rawk led to redistribution of Iqta‘ lands and the increase of the Sultan’s portion of lands called
khass (elevated to 10 shares of the land out of 24 shares, instead of the four shares out of 24
shares previously held by the Sultans), which he either held or distributed as Iqta‘ to his Sultanic
Mamluks.8 The amount of taxes levied from the Khass lands would thus increase.
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The muqta‘ was paid through the land’s revenues, referred to in sources as the‘ibra,
which basically consisted of the kharaj tax.1 The kharaj was assessed and collected based on the
land’s productivity. It was paid either in kind (a proportion of the products of the lands) or in
cash.2 The muqta‘s had also other rights including the diyafa, which constituted of goods that
the peasants of the Iqta‘ presented to the him on irregular basis, and the right to mobilize the
peasants to accomplish works for the state in dikes’ construction and maintenance. 3
Hence, both the state and the Mamluk military revenues relied heavily on agriculture and
on the iqta‘ system, described correctly as “the backbone of the Mamluk institution.”4 Obtaining
the support of the Mamluk by granting them highly productive lands as iqta‘ was also necessary
to guarantee the stability and continuity of the regime. This created a clash between the interests
of the state and those of the Iqta‘ holders. The State was in search of revenues for the treasury
from the land tax, while landholders attempted to make permanent wealth from a source that was
transitory in nature, by transforming lands into endowments.
However, there was a legal impediment to this transformation, since an endowment must
fulfil several conditions in order to be legally valid. One of the most important condition for the
validity of the Waqf is that the endower should be the owner of the endowed property. This
condition raises many questions as to whether –and if yes, how- it was legally fulfilled in the
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endowments of agricultural lands made in the Mamluk era in light of the landholding system
prevailing in Mamluk Egypt which only give the muqta‘ usufruct rights over the land. It also
raises the issue of the validity of endowments made in this period where most religious scholars
believed that the lands of Egypt were state-owned lands, private ownership of lands being the
exception.
The following sections will thus explore religious scholars’ positions (in Egypt and
Syria) as to the landholding systems and the ownership of the land as a necessary condition for
the validity of the endowments. The selection of opinions, rejecting some and adopting others in
relation to the ownership of lands, and later, the adaptation of these opinions to validate
endowments, help showing how Islamic law developed in this area. Studying these opinions in
their economic and social context shed light on the real reasons behind this legal development.

Who owns the land?
During the Mamluk era, all Egypt’s lands were owned by the state. To reach this point,
the legal status of lands developed over times.
The legal status of the conquered lands (outside the Arabian peninsula) following the
Islamic conquests is one of the most confusing and complicated subjects in Islamic law. The
question of whether private title to lands existed in the first hundred and fifty years of Islam is
much debated, a strong argument being that all the lands in this early Islamic period were owned
by the state. The refusal of Umar to distribute the conquered lands to the conquerors gave no
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room to the emergence of Muslim landholders. It is widely acknowledged that the literature on
the subject is contradictory and confusing. 1
Lands were classified based on the mode of their conquest, by treaty or by force, at the
beginning, and then depending on the taxes levied on them. 2 This led to the emergence of many
classifications of lands. The two main sources on which modern historians based their
classifications are Kitab al-Kharaj for Abu Yusuf, written during the Abbasid period to answer
the queries of Harun al-Rashid, and al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya of al-Mawardi. The two are
considered the only sources which clearly mentioned dates and included elaborated information
and categories.3 According to these sources, lands may be classified in many ways, but the most
common being their division into Kharaj lands, which belong to the state according to Abu
Yusuf, ushur lands, which are privately owned by Muslims paying tithes, and the lands which
the Muslims took over through agreements with their holders. 4
For the Hanafi- Abu Yusuf (d. 182 / 798 ), 5 in his Kitab al-Kharaj, are divided in two
types based on their mode of conquest. First, the lands conquered by force and left within the
hands of its holders.6 Second, the lands that the Muslims took through agreement by their holders
(sulh). These two types are kharaj lands. Lands conquered by force may also be divided between
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the conquerors. These lands are ‘ushr (tithe) lands, owned by the conquerors.1 Kharaj lands,
according to Abu Yusuf, are owned by their holders. These lands can thus be sold and inherited
by their progeny.2 Uncultivated lands which were conquered by force and had no owner (called
mawat lands), become the state’s property. The Caliph may allocate them as Iqta‘ or rent them.
A person who cultivates (revive) the mawat land may become its owner, if the caliph approved
his ownership.3
For the Shafi‘i school, especially al-Mawardi (374/975-450/1058) 4, lands took over
through agreements with its Non- Muslim holders (sulh) were kharaj lands, while the lands
conquered by force were divided between the conquerors. 5 Lands took by agreement (sulh)
became an endowment for the Muslims (takun waqfan ’ala masalih al-muslimin) if their original
holders fled. If the holders remained in the lands and agreed to pay its kharaj, they will continue
to own them, unless they decide to waive their property rights to the state. If the holders waive
the land’s property to the state, the latter state becomes the owner of the lands, which are
endowed for the benefits of all Muslims. Lands endowed in this way cannot be sold, while the
landholders become tenants and the kharaj they pay is the rent. Their lease cannot be terminated
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and they remain in the lands as tenants, while the land is endowed for the benefit of the
Muslims.1 To explain the position of the Iraq lands, that Umar left to the holders despite being
conquered by force, Shafi‘i scholars assumed that the Iraqi lands were divided between the
conquerors, who later waived them to the state. Umar decided to impose kharaj on these lands,
and they also became an endowment for the Muslims. 2
During the Mamluk era, the Hanafi scholar Kamal al-Din Ibn al-Humam, 3 repeated Abu
Yusuf’s opinion that the kharaj lands are owned by their holders who have the right to dispose of
them. He also compared the position of other school of laws. According to the Shafi‘i (as well as
the Maliki and Hanbali schools), lands taken by force and left to their holders became
endowment for the benefit of the Muslim community, and cannot be sold. 4 Ibn al-Humam stated
that Egypt’s lands were kharaj lands, originally owned privately by their holders. The legal
status of Egypt’s lands was determined on the basis of the Iraqi case, since Egypt’s lands were
considered to have the same status as the Iraqi lands. 5
During this period, however, lands were to be distributed as Iqta‘ to pay the Mamluk
army. This necessitated that the state controls agricultural lands in order to be able to distribute
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their usufruct rights as Iqta‘. At the same time, rulers wished to endow agricultural lands, either
to compensate the lack of state’s revenues, to strengthen their power and authority through
acquisition of Mamluks, or to secure revenues for their progeny.
The distribution of lands as iqta‘ required the following: first, lands should not be owned
privately. Second, the state must be the owner of the lands. To establish endowments, the state –
Bayt al-mal-, should be able to validly sell these lands to be endowed, endow them directly or to
dissolve existing endowments to control the lands again. A number of scholars came up with
solutions to these legal problems that would facilitate for the Sultan to endow agricultural lands.
For instance, Hanafi scholars came with a new idea to confirm the state’s ownership of
the lands. They formulated a theory that landholders, original owners of the lands (their holders
following the conquest) died without heirs, and therefore according to Islamic law of inheritance,
the lands reverted to the state. Lands fell within the property of Bayt al-mal, and thus became an
endowment for the benefit of the Muslims.1 This theory was adopted by the Egyptian religious
scholar Kamal al-Din Ibn al-Humam (790-861/1388-1457). This theory implied that the Sultan
can directly endow the lands for public welfare, and can sell them so they could to be able to
endow them later. Ibn al-Humam, however, had some reservations on the kind of actions the
Sultan could take.
Ibn al-Humam rejected the sale or the purchase by the ruler, directly or indirectly through
an agent, of the lands of Bayt al-mal, except in case of necessity. He mentioned an instance when
Sultan Barsbay consulted him on whether he could purchase a plot of land from the supervisor of
Bayt al-mal. His answer was that such a purchase was only possible in case of necessity (darura)
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and need (haja).1 Ibn al-Humam thus added a condition to the sale of Bayt al-mal property, but
did not prohibit it. This opinion may be the reason why many deeds of the sale of Bayt al-mal
lands included a phrase to the effect that the sale was made to fund the army and prepare it to
war, despite the fact that this statement was not always real, as has been clearly shown in the
work of ’Imad Abu Ghazi, that I will examine later.
Kenneth Cuno considered Ibn-Humam’s views to be influenced by the prevailing social
circumstances in his time, where the appropriation of state lands in form of sale or endowment
became common.2 Despite the fact that Ibn al-Humam did not expressly agree to the
appropriation of state’s lands, he offered a plausible explanation for the process of privatization
of these lands, through the theory of the death of the original owners of the lands without heirs
and the transfer of their property to Bayt al-Mal. 3
Ibn al-Humam’s importance comes from the fact that he was extensively cited by later
scholars during Mamluk and Ottoman periods. His views could be explained partially by his close
links to the power structure. His family held many judgeship positions, and he was the disciple of
many important Hanafi jurists, like Ibn Hajar al-’Asqalani and Muhib al-Din Ibn al-Shihna. Ibn
al-Humam was appointed Shaykh in many important schools, such as the school of Qalawun
(madrassa al-Quba al-Mansuriyya) where he taught exegesis in 822/1419, the madrassa established
by Barsbay in 829/1426 (and resigned after four years), and the Shaykhuniyya in 858/1453. He
was also appointed as deputy judge. His views were often quoted in works on Waqf, such as the
writings of Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti and Qassim ibn Qutlubgha al-Hanafi. This very short biography
of Ibn al-Humam shows that he had all the reasons to seek to validate endowments and satisfy the
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rulers at the same time: holding simultaneously judgeship and professorship positions, an
important portion of his income relied on the revenues of endowments. His position was therefore
a reconciling one: while offering an explanation for the state’s ownership of agricultural lands,
which is contrary – or an innovation to the opinions of his school where kharaj lands are private
milk, he took the view that lands of Bayt al-mal could only be sold in case of necessity.
Ibn al-Humam’ views were adopted by scholars of the period immediately following the
Mamluk era. Ibn Nujaym, referencing Fath al-Qadir, reiterated the view that lands of Egypt
were kharaj lands privately owned by their holders, and then became the ownership of the state
by the death of proprietors without heirs.1 However, Ibn Nujaym disagreed with Ibn al-Humam
regarding the sale of Bayt al-mal lands. Ibn Nujaym, making various analogy with the sale of the
orphan properties by the guardian, concluded that the sale of Bayt al-mal property is permitted if
there is an interest or a necessity to sell it, contrary to Ibn al-Humam restrictive approach
requiring only a case of necessity.2
To conclude, Hanafi and Shafi‘i scholars of the Mamluk era adopted the position that
Egypt’s lands were state’s lands, owned by the state or Bayt al-mal. The basis of these opinions
differ, since Hanafi scholars adopted Ibn al-Humam’s position that the proprietors of the lands
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died without heirs, while Shafi‘i scholars took the view that the lands were an endowment (waqf)
for the benefit of the Muslims since their conquest.
Being owned by the state, how could these lands be validly endowed? And how did
various scholars deal with this issue?

How to endow state’s lands?
I examined in chapter II the reasons for the large endowments in Mamluk period. I suggest
that the desire of the ruling elite to endow agricultural lands and the position of the jurists who
depended on endowments to get their revenues influenced the latter’s positions and opinions
regarding the endowments made from state’s property. Power exercised on these jurists by the
ruling elite and the ulama’s interests in endowments helped in shaping new opinions and
selecting specific views from earlier jurists to rely on them and guarantee the validity and the
continuity of the endowment, including those made from lands owned by the state. These issues
are examined in the following sections.
The majority of Hanafi scholars before and during the Mamluk era prohibited the endowment
of Bayt al-mal property. However, in the early Ottoman period, Ibn Nujaym (926/1520970/1563) legalized such endowment on the basis of an opinion of one Mamluk jurist, Qassim.
Ibn Nujaym selected this opinion and neglected the majority of the opinions of the Hanafi
scholars at the time. This was an important change in the legal thought and was done without
bringing in new ideas. I will examine in detail this issue in the following paragraphs. The Hanafi
school’s position became, following this opinion, nearer to that of the Shafi‘i scholars. The latter,
however, had different reasons to adopt this opinion.
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Hanafi School:
The earliest treaties on endowments in Islamic law were both written by Hanafi scholars,
namely, Abu Bakr Ahmad ibn ‘Amr al-Shaybani, known as al-Khassaf (d. 261 / 874), and Hilal
Ibn Yahia Ibn Salama al-Ra’i (d. 245/859), known as Hilal al-Ra’i. Their treatises seem to have
given the Waqf institution its existence in Islamic law. 1 Despite being much earlier than the
Mamluk era, the study of their work is important in order to examine whether a change has
occurred in religious scholars opinions due to the circumstances in the Mamluk era.
Al-Khassaf 2 wrote a Chapter on “A Man who endow land from the kharaj land or
Sadaqa land and other similar land.”3 For al-Khassaf, kharaj lands meant the lands privately
owned by their holders. The latter were only obliged to pay the tax land in the form of kharaj to
the state. Sadaqa land (or ’ushr land) were also owned by their holders, who were obliged to pay
the ’ushr.4 These two types of lands may be validly endowed.
When it comes to Iqta‘, al-Khassaf took the view that a land given to a Muqta‘ who
becomes its owner may be validly endowed. 5 It should be noted that the term Iqta’ in alKhassaf’s context had a different meaning than in the Mamluk era. Iqta‘ of lands before the
4th/10th century involved a transfer of the property of the land to the Muqta‘ subject to tithe.6
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Accordingly, there seems to be no legal issue to endow lands subject to Iqta‘ at that time,
because there were owned by the muqta‘. However, an endowment made by a tenant without
title to the land, for instance by peasants working in the land granted to the Muqta‘ is null and
void.1
Immediately after this section, al-Khassaf added a section titled “al- Iqta‘ from Bayt almal,” where he states clearly that rights that the Sultan allocated from Bayt al-Mal as iqta’,
cannot be validly endowed.2 Al-Khassaf explained how a right of Bayt al-mal could be allocated
as iqta’:
“This is an individual’s land, that is kharaj land owned by its holders, the Sultan
takes half of the crops which Allah produces from the land. The Sultan then
allocates a part of this half paid to Bayt al-Mal to an individual. The Sultan gives
this individual 4/5 of this half, and he pays the 1/5 to Bayt al-mal.” 3
This is the case where the lands are privately owned and their kharaj is due to the state.
The ruler gives the kharaj as Iqta‘, and then may only receive a part from the amounts collected
by the Muqta‘.4 That Muqta‘ cannot endow this Iqta‘, because he cannot endow a state’s right, or
a right of Bayt al-Mal.5 In sum, the most important Hanafi scholar took a stand against
endowment of rights allocated as Iqta‘ that only involved granting of usufruct rights.
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The second early and important Hanafi scholar who wrote a treatise on Waqf is Hilal Ibn
Yaḥyia, called Hilal al-Ra’i. His treatise is titled Ahkam al-Waqf.1 Hilal expressed many
opinions entailing that the endower of a property must be its owner. 2 It is therefore understood
and clear that a person cannot endow a land to which he has no title. Despite the details in his
treaties, Hilal, contrary to al-Khassaf, did not address specifically the endowment of state lands
or of iqta’ land.
Al-Khassaf and Hilal dealt with the lands of Iraq. As shown previously, the legal status of the
lands of Egypt followed the legal status of the lands of Iraq.
The opinions of early Hanafi scholars continued to be important in the 14 th and 15th centuries,
since there are a number of examples of scholars during these centuries who repeated similar
views concerning the endowment of Iqta‘ land. Opinions of scholars expressed during the
Mamluk era reiterated the same condition of the ownership of the endowed property by the
endower for the validity of endowments based on the early writings of al-Khassaf and Hilal.
Those writings held the endowments of Bayt al-mal lands as invalid.
This condition is clear in the writings of the Damascene Qadi and jurist Najm al-Din
Ibrahim Ibn Ali Ibn Ahmed Al-Tarsusi, (721-758/1321-1357), 3 in his book titled ‘Anfa’ alWasa’il ’Ila Tahrir al-Masai’il, also known as al-Fatawa al-Tarsusiyya. Al-Tarsusi referred and
relied extensively on the opinions of early Hanafi scholars, such as Abu Hanifa, Abu Yusuf,
Muhammad al-Shaybani, al-Khassaf and Qadikhan. Despite the fact that he did not mention
ownership as a clear condition for the validity of the endowments, his chapters on the validity of
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dealing with other issues related to endowments are clear in showing that he considered the
ownership of the endowed property as a condition for the validity of the endowment. 1
Kamal al-Din Ibn al-Humam (790- 861/1388-1457) explained in Sharh Fath al-Qadir, that
“an endower is an owner free to dispose of his property as he wishes.” 2 Ibn al-Humam stated
clearly that the ownership of the endowed property at the time of the establishment of the
endowment is a condition for the validity of the Waqf. Accordingly, if a person took over a land
and endowed it –while he is not its owner, and he then purchased it from its proprietor and paid
the price, his endowment would still be invalid (and not validated retrospectively), because he
obtained the title of the land after he had already endowed it. 3 Ibn al-Humam did not address, in
his section on Waqf, the endowment of Iqta‘ or Bayt al-mal property. Cuno explained this by the
fact that in most of the cases, Shafi’i scholars were consulted on the validity of endowments of
Bayt al-mal by the Mamluk elite, since the Shafi’i was the dominant school during the Mamluk
era, Shafi’i judges being responsible for the supervision of endowments. 4
Another important Hanafi scholar at the end of the Mamluk period dealt with endowment
of iqta‘, Burhan al-Din al-Tarabulsi (853-922/ 1449-1516) studied in his book titled Al-is’af fi
Ahkam al-Awqaf ,5 “the property that might be endowed, what should not be endowed, and the
endowment of property that the ruler allocates as Iqta‘.6 Only the owner of the land can endow
it. Al-Tarabulsi did not define exactly what he meant by Iqta‘, however, it is clear that he did not
consider that an Iqta‘ of a land by the Sultan gives the Muqta‘ property rights over the land. Al-
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Tarabulsi divided Iqta‘ allocated by the Sultan to an individual into two types, depending of its
origin. If the land was originally owned by the Sultan who transferred its ownership to the
Muqta‘ or if the land was mawat, its endowment by the Muqta‘ is valid. If the land allocated by
the Sultan as Iqta‘ was the property of Bayt al-mal, the endowment of such land is not valid. 1
An endowment of a land purchased by the endower by a contract of sale that is null and void
becomes also null and void.2
Clearly, then, an endowment of a land that is not owned by the endower is not valid. The
endowment of Bayt al-mal property, according to the Hanafi school, was invalid and impossible
to validate.
Ibn Nujaym followed the same condition of the ownership of the property when the waqf
was established. Thus, the acquisition of the title after the date of its endowment does not
validate it retrospectively.3 However, Ibn Nujaym differed with the previous Hanafi scholars
when it comes to endowment of agricultural lands owned by Bayt al-mal.
To summarize, the endowment of an Iqta’ granting only usufruct rights is not valid. Iqta’
land that was a mawat or the property of the ruler and was allocated to an individual who became
its owner may be validly endowed. Lands owned by Bayt al-mal cannot validly be endowed
unless purchased prior to their endowment, when such sale is possible.
However, one Hanafi scholar seems to have a different opinion. In his Al-Tuhfa al-Murdiyya
fi-l-aradi al-Misriyya, Ibn Nujaym cited a Hanafi scholar called “Qassim”, who believed that an
endowment of the property of Bayt al-mal by a Sultan is valid. I assume that he may be Qassim
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Ibn Qutlubgha.1 Ibn Nujaym divided the endowers into many categories. First, the owners of the
lands (malik) who may validly them, since they own the lands privately. Second, endowers to
whom the Sultan allocated the lands as iqta‘. These persons only endow their lands if the Iqta‘
transferred their property to the muqta‘, or if the lands were mawat lands, or if the lands were the
Sultan’s property. The third type is the endowers who endow the lands owned by Bayt al-mal.
These lands may be allocated as usufruct Iqta‘, and in this case cannot be validly endowed.
Lands bought from Bayt al-mal, either by Sultans or individuals, could also be validly endowed. 2
The view that is different from the rest of Hanafi scholars of Qassim’s era, however, is
the possibility to endow land owned by Bayt al-mal by the Sultan without previously purchasing
it. In this case, Qassim considered that the endowment is valid. Ibn Nujaym reported that Qassim
issued this opinion to Sultan Jaqmaq when the latter sought Qassim’s view to endow a property
owned by Bayt al-mal for the benefit of a mosque. Qassim found the endowment to be valid,
despite the fact that the land was not previously purchased from Bayt al-mal. Qassim prohibited
future Sultans to take over the land, which had now become a valid endowment. 3 In that specific
case, Barquq had previously endowed (arsadaha) that same plot of land for the benefit of an
individual, then for the benefit of a mosque. Interestingly, Qassim qualified Barquq’s
endowment as Irsad, and invalidated it because “it did not include an express endowment.”
Accordingly, Jaqmaq was allowed by this fatwa to take over the land and re-endow it for the
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benefit of a mosque. No future Sultan could annul it, according to Qassim. 1 Ibn Nujaym reported
Qassim’s view without mentioning any justifications for it.
Ibn Nujaym adopted this opinion, in a clear divergence from the majority opinion of the
Hanafi school. It is possible to trace here the tool of legal development described by Hallaq as
the “selective appropriation and the manipulation of earlier juristic discourse” occurring within
one school, as well as the manipulation of earlier authorities to select a weaker position
expressed by an earlier jurist because of social needs.2 Ibn Nujaym preferred Qassim’s minor
position, in addition to Ibn al-Humam’s theory on the death of the post-conquest landowners and
the validity of the sale of Bayt al-mal lands to resist later Ottoman attempts to recover the
endowed lands. Ibn Nujaym sought to establish, without producing documentary evidence as
required by the Ottomans, that the lands were validly endowed because their property was
validly transferred from Bayt al-mal, or because it was legal for the Sultan to endow directly
form Bayt al-mal properties.3
Commenting on Qassim’s opinion, Ibn ‘Abdin concluded correctly that the endowment for
the benefits of the Muslim is in reality the same as the Irsad of the Shafi‘i school, and therefore
there is no real contradiction between these two schools on the validity of the endowment of
Bayt al-mal property by the rulers. Ibn ‘Abdin quoted extensively the Shafi‘i scholars living and
opining during the Mamluk era, especially al-Bulqini and al-Suyuti, and concluded that the
Hanafi School agreed with their position.4
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The Shafi‘i school and the Notion of Irsad:
Religious scholars had also an interest in the continuity of many types of endowments,
especially those supporting madrassas and the instructors working in them. Consequently, they
found other means and justification to validate, even partially, endowments made from Bayt almal properties. The legality of receiving benefits from endowments containing agricultural lands
was also of a great importance for Mamluk jurists, since they were the main beneficiaries from
such endowments. I suggest that it is within this context that Shafi’i scholars developed the
notion of Irsad, to validate endowments of Bayt al-mal property, through re-qualifying them, and
legalize receiving benefits from these endowments.
They invoked the notion of the Muslim’s interests, advanced by an early Damascene jurist,
al-Nawawi. The following paragraphs will study his views, as well as the views of other Shafi‘i
scholars who contributed to the development of the law of endowment within the Shafi‘i school.
Muhi al-Din Yahya al-Nawawi, was an important and often cited scholar who lived
during both Ayubid and beginning of the Mamluk era. 1 He was born in 631/1233 in Damascus,
where he died in 676/1277. He wrote many important books, including al-Masa’il al-Manthura
also known as al-fatawa. These included many questions and issues he was consulted upon. His
disciple, Ibn al-’Attar organized them in a book and added to them other issues he heard from alNawawi during his life.2
The collection of al-Nawawi’s fatawa includes a chapter related to endowments. The
first question concerned the validity of an endowment of a land made by the Sultan, if he had
bought this land from Bayt-al-mal, or if he endowed a land owned by Bayt-al-mal. The question
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specified that the endowment was made for the interest of the Muslims (shay’ min masalih almuslimin), such as a school, a hospital, a zawyia, or for the benefit of a good man or his progeny,
and after him for the poor. The answer was short, but clear:
“Yes, it is valid to endow a property of Bayt-al-mal if he [the sultan] sees an interest in
this (maslaha), because Bayt-al-mal is for the benefit “masalih” of the Muslims, and
“this” (supposedly the beneficiaries) is part of this benefit or masalih”.1
No other details were mentioned regarding the conditions and terms of this endowment. AlNawawi said nothing, in this book, on the validity of an endowment where the endowed property
is not owned by the endower.
Siraj al-Din al-Bulqini2 also expressed an important view in the same issue. In a meeting
convened by Barquq, then the Atabik ‘Askar, in 780/1479, attended by Burhan al-Din Ibn Juma’a
and the Hanafi scholar Akmal al-Din, author of the book Sharh al-Hidaya, al-Bulqini, when
invited to speak, objected to Barquq’s intentions to dissolve the endowments made from Bayt almal properties. Barquq sought the chief justices opinion regarding the dissolution of the
endowments of lands in Egypt and Syria for the benefit of mosques, madrassas and Sufi lodges,
endowments of lands for the benefit of the progeny of Sultans and princes, and the rizaq
ihbasiyya.3 Barquq established that large plots of lands were endowed or sold in Egypt and Syria,
which caused losses to the army. Clearly, this attempt to dissolve the endowments of lands was
driven by the necessity to increase the state resources and to regain control over the state lands.
Igarashi argued that Barquq’s attempts to discuss the issue of endowments with religious
scholars and judges -because of their negative effect on the iqta‘ system, was a part of his
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“consistent efforts to place awqaf under governmental control, which had hitherto being limited
because the awqaf were ‘religious trusts’.” 1 Later endowments by Barquq of large plots of lands
was not perceived by Igarashi as a contradiction in Barquq’s conduct, since he considered that
Barquq’s intent was to place the lands he endowed under the state’s control after his death. 2
Muhammad Amin also recognized that Barquq’s attempts reflected his perception that the state
owned endowed lands, and therefore they must be under the state’s control. He noticed correctly
the contradiction between Barquq’s attempts to confiscate awqaf and Barquq’s own conduct in
endowing many lands for charity and religious purposes. 3
During the meeting, Al-Bulqini stated that endowments benefiting religious scholars,
madrassas, mosques and Sufi institutions should not be dissolved, while other endowments made
for the benefit of individuals may be terminated. Al-Bulqini defended explicitly the interests of
the ulama, not only knowledgeable and famous muftis or religious scholars, but also various
types of minor religious functions like the mu’azins and prayers leaders, who also benefited from
the endowments. Al-Bulqini considered that the payments they received from the endowments
were the ulama’s rights, and that they deserve to obtain higher amounts than those paid to them
from the revenues of endowments. If the state wished to dissolve endowments, a specific diwan
should be established to ensure payments of the stipends of the scholars and other religious
functions.4
Despite al-Bulqini’s objection, Barquq’s plans were implemented, and many endowments
were dissolved and transformed into Iqta‘.5 Yet his view was not in total opposition to the
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dissolution of endowments. Al-Bulqini’s did not recognize the validity of endowments of lands
of Bayt al-mal, except where the endowments were made for the benefit of scholars and religious
institutions. For the lands endowed for other purposes, Al-Bulqini took the view that they must
be examined: if the lands were legally acquired, through valid purchase, for instance, the
endowments cannot be dissolved. If this is not case, the endowments may be terminated, because
the lands’ acquisition is not valid. This position ensured the continuity of the revenues generated
by the endowed lands to religious scholars, regardless of the means or the validity of the lands’
acquisition.1 Al-Bulqini had not mentioned, at this stage, the notion of Irsad, which was later
developed by Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti, al-Bulqini’s disciple.2
Taqi al-Din Al-Subki’s fatawa also considered whether it was legal for scholars to be
beneficiaries of the revenues of endowments. Born in Egypt, in Subk, Minufiyya, in 683/1284,
al-Subki became judge in Damascus in 1338, then he moved back to Cairo in 756/1355 where he
died only twenty days after his arrival.3 Al-Subki replied to a question on whether the scholars
are allowed to earn their livings from the endowments “of this era”. To answer the question, alSubki considered the endowments made from doubtful origins, i.e. if there are doubts as to the
legality of the acquisition of the endowed properties. He considered that religious scholars
should not earn their living from these types of endowments because they were suspect (fiha
shubha). Al-Subki added that many of endowments made by members the ruling elite would
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have suspect origins if they had acquired the endowed property without observing proper rules.
In al-Subki’s words:
“There are other endowments that kings make from Bayt al-mal. Endowment from Bayt
al-mal is subject to Ijtihad, therefore refraining from obtaining their revenues is pious
(wara‘), while taking it [i.e the revenues or the stipends] is suspect (shubha).”1
Interestingly, al-Subki blamed himself because during his youth, he profited from such
endowments without necessity. He expressed his wish that Allah would pardon him. 2
In other words, there were practical rather than legal reasons for accepting such
endowments. Accordingly, al-Subki did not directly comment on the legality of the endowments
from Bayt al-mal property by Sultans, but it seems that he believed that they were not legal and
preferred not to rely on them for the revenues of the religious scholars. The fact that he blamed
himself for profiting from these endowments without “necessity (darura)” opens the door to
claim that in case of necessity, which may be poverty or scarcity of resources, scholars may
legitimately benefit from these endowments.
In his fatawa on endowments, Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti (849-911 A.H/ 1445-1505) clearly
stated that it is possible for the Sultan to endow a plot of land from Bayt al-mal property. The
question posed to al-Suyuti related to a plot of land in Egypt held by some members of the Bakri
family.3 Their title to the land consisted in a decision of a Shafi‘i judge stating that the land was
endowed to their benefit by the Ayubid Sultan Salah al-Din. The question had two parts: first, is
it possible for the Sultan to endow such land owned by Bayt al-mal without purchasing it, and
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second, if a jurist who considered that Egypt’s lands were conquered by force should declare this
endowment null and void?
Al-Suyuti replied in clear terms that the ruler may validly “endow some of the lands of
Bayt al-mal without purchasing them previously” to profit individuals according to the correct
opinion in the Shafi‘i school. Al-Suyuti asserted that the validity of this type of endowment was
recognised by Al-Shafi‘i, as well as other scholars during the Ayubid and the Mamluk era,
including al-Nawawi. These endowments (whose beneficiaries are members of a family or
individuals) are valid and cannot be modified by later Sultans. Al-Suyuti also mentioned alSubki’s opinion1 that the Sultan or the ruler cannot validly endow the property of Bayt al-mal.
However, al-Subki agreed with the other jurists of the school that endowments that were already
made by previous rulers should not be altered. A jurist who believed that Egypt’s lands were
conquered by force is not entitled to declare these endowments invalid, because at the time they
were made, the endowers (rulers) relied on the opinions of the jurists from all religious schools
existing at their times.2
Al-Suyuti recognized that most of the endowments made by Sultans and amirs originated
in properties of Bayt al-mal. These endowed properties were used to fund madrassas in Egypt.
Accordingly, religious scholars, students or Sufis who deserve payments from Bayt al-mal have
the right to benefit from the revenues of these endowments no matter what the conditions of the
endower were. He based this opinion on the fact that the endowed property remains within the
ownership of Bayt al-mal and does not become private property. 3 Of course, it is hard to
1

I assume he means Taqi al-Din al-Subki rather than Taj al-din al-Subki, the former’s son, since al-Suyuti
mentioned Taj al-Din as Taj al-Din Ibn al-Subki in the ’Insaf, which indicates that referring to “al-Subki” alone
means Taqi al-Din. See Al-Suyuti, Al-Hawi lil Fatawi, 1: 150.
2
Ibid., 1:147-148.
"ﻧعم لﻺمام أن يقف بعض أراضي بيت المال من غير شراء على مثل هذه الجهة المذكورة على اﻷصح في المذهب أما السبكي فاخﺘار لنفسه أﻧه ﻻ يجوز
"لﻺمام الوقف لكن ما وجدﻧاه موقوفا ﻷحد من اﻷئمة فليﺲ لنا أن ﻧغيره
3
Ibid., 1: 148-149.
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conceive that al-Suyuti examined all the endowment deeds founding the madrassas in Egypt, and
that his statement that endowments supporting these institutions always come from Bayt al-mal
is based on a real survey. However, this statement shows the real intention for his view. Notably,
the interest of the scholars working in these madrassa-s and ensuring the continuity of their
revenues as well as the revenues of the students and Sufis. This result could not be achieved
without holding valid the endowments that the ruling elite made from the lands of Bayt al-mal.
The conditions were of concern to scholars in times of the shortage, in many cases, of the
revenues generated by the endowments which supported the madrassas and other religious
institutions during the fifteenth century, so much that it became impossible to pay stipends to
students, Sufis and teachers in the way provided for in the endowment deed.
Al-Suyuti addressed this issue in his risala titled al-’Insaf fi tamyyiz al-Awqaf, where he
was answering a question related to an endowment of a khanqah whose revenues became
insufficient to cover the expenses of its Sufis and sheikhs. He was asked how to distribute the
stipends of the Sufis, disciples and sheikhs in light of this shortage, who would be paid first, and
whether the revenues should be divided on pro-rata basis.1
Al-Suyuti replied by a detailed presentation of the types of endowments that existed in
his time. He divided the endowments in two types: private endowments, whose properties do not
originate in Bayt al-mal, and other endowments whose origins come from Bayt al-mal. While the
conditions of the former type should be interpreted in a strict way and the stipulations of the
endower should be observed and meticulously complied with, the latter type should be treated in
a different way. This type included, according to al-Suyuti, endowments made by previous rulers
as well as endowments established by Mamluk Sultans or Mamluk amirs since the Qalawunid

1

See, Al-Suyuti, Al-’Insaf fi Tamyyiz al Awqaf, in Al-Hawi lil Fatawi, 1: 150-152.
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period until his time. Al-Suyuti considered that all endowments established by Mamluk Sultans
or amirs were necessarily the property of Bayt al-mal because these Mamluks were slaves owned
by Bayt al-mal and their manumission is not certain. The properties they endowed, including
lands, originally belong to Bayt al-mal. Based on this fact, al-Suyuti concluded that scholars and
students should be granted the right to benefit from these endowments without strict observance
of the conditions of the endowers, because they have a right to be paid from Bayt al-mal. AlSuyuti added that the payments that religious scholars and students ought to receive exceeded
significantly what they actually earn from Bayt al-mal.1
Al-Suyuti based his distinction between the two types of endowments upon the earlier
opinions within the Shafi‘i school, including al-Bulqini’s opinion expressed in Barquq’s meeting
mentioned above. Al-Suyuti explained the divergence between the jurists of the school by the
different circumstances in their times. For instance, al-Nawawi maintained strict opinions in
matters of endowments, while al-Subki and al-Bulqini held more flexible opinions because most
of the endowments at the time of al-Nawawi were of private properties, while most of the
endowments made since the seventh A.H./twelfth C.E and the eighth A.H/ thirteenth C.E.
centuries, when al-Subki and al-Bulqini lived, had public origins. 2 Furthermore, the salaries that
religious scholars used to obtain from Bayt al-mal in were cancelled, and religious scholars as
well as students no longer earned their salaries from Bayt al-mal. Accordingly, they might be
paid through these endowments even if they did not comply strictly with the conditions of the

1

Al-Suyuti, Al-Hawi lil Fatawi, 1: 150.
In al-Suyuti’s words:  وإذا تﺄملت فﺘاوى السبكي،"ومنها أﻧك إذا تﺄملت فﺘاوى النووي وابن الصﻼح وجدتهما يﺘشددان في اﻷوقاف غاية الﺘشديد
 فإن غالب اﻷوقاف الﺘي،والبلقيني وسائر المﺘﺄخرين وجدتهم يرخصون ويسهلون وليﺲ ذلك مخالفة منهم للنووي بل كل تكلم بحسب الواقع في زمنه
 وإﻧما حدثت أوقاف اﻷتراك في أواخر القرن السابع وكثرت في القرن الثامن وهو عصر السبكي ومن،كاﻧت في زمن النووي وابن الصﻼح كاﻧت خاصة
( فرأى العلماء أن هذه اﻷوقاف أرصدت لهم من بيت...) بعده وقطعت اﻷرزاق الﺘي كاﻧت تجري على الفقهاء من بيت المال من عهد عمر بن الخطاب
"المال عوضا عما كاﻧوا يﺄخذوﻧه منه كل عام فرخصوا فيها
Al-Suyuti, Al-Hawi lil Fatawi, 1: 151.
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endower. Al-Suyuti thus considered these endowments as Irsad for the payment of the ulama and
the students based on al-Bulqini’s opinion expressed in the meeting with Barquq. 1
Al-Suyuti’s statements can be summarized as follows: endowments made by Mamluk
Sultans and amirs are (always) endowments of Bayt al-mal properties. If these endowments were
for the benefit of a specific group of individuals, they are valid and should be respected
according to the majority of the Shafi‘i scholars, except al-Subki, who took the view that it is not
possible to make such endowments. However, previous endowments should not be altered. If
these endowments –of public origin- were for the benefit of a madrassa, then they are considered
to be Irsad for the benefits of religious scholars to compensate their payments from Bayt al-mal
which were cancelled. Therefore, conditions set forth by the establishers of these Irsad should
not be strictly observed. Al-Suyuti did not declare these endowments null and void, but rather he
re-qualified them into Irsad, in order to be valid for the payment of the religious scholars, but he
did not consider them entirely as endowments.
This maneuvering of earlier works of jurisprudence clearly shows the development of the
law of endowments by legalizing endowments of public origins. This process necessitated alSuyuti to use various mechanisms. First, the choice he made between the different views, by
selecting and adopting the views of al-Nawawi and al-Bulqini, and rejecting and ignoring those
of al-Subki’s. Behind this choice was his desire to legalize endowments made from Bayt al-mal
properties, even when they were made for the benefit of private individuals. He manipulated alNawawi’s opinion, since the latter validated endowments of Bayt al-mal property if they were
made for an interest of the Muslims, which is more difficult to identify in case of endowment for
the benefit of specific individuals or specific families. Second, he developed the notion of Irsad,
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Ibid.,1: 150-152.
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by choosing parts of al-Nawawi’s concept of the interests of the Muslims, selecting al-Bulqini’s
views, and rejecting al-Subki’s doubts. This notion of Irsad allowed him to validate, once again,
endowments of public properties for the benefit of madrassas, while avoiding the strict
observance of the conditions of the endowers, and thus allowing jurists and students to get their
payments in a way that is different from the endower’s original stipulations.
I suggest that the importance of the revenues that religious scholars obtained from
madrassas and endowments, and the defense of the interests of all the group of religious scholars
or those holding minor religious positions, explains the views of the Shafi‘i scholars. This
position is not also in total contradiction with the ruling elite who aimed at either endowing from
Bayt al-mal property or dissolving endowments, to re-endow the lands or sell them. For the
former, they may purchase the lands from Bayt al-mal. For the latter, they only have to establish
that the lands were not acquired legally. In other words, those views were a reflection of the
interest of the Mamluk ruling class, as well as of the interest of the ulama.
It is also to be noted that Shafi‘i scholars did not adopt a clear position on the validity of
the sale of lands of Bayt al-mal, since their views varied between one scholar and another. AlBulqini’s view seems to validate it. However, this would be in contradiction –or a development
by exclusion- to the position of the Shafi‘i school from the ownership of the lands. This school,
as previously studied, considered that the conquered lands were owned by the state, and they
were endowed for the benefit of all Muslims. This view justifies the validity of Irsad, but it
cannot justify the validity of the sale of Bayt al-mal, since the endowed lands (which belong to
the state) cannot be sold.
In conclusion, for the Hanafi scholars, an endower must be the owner of the land he
endows. Lands of Egypt were originally owned privately by the population who paid their
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kharaj. By time, the proprietors died and the lands fell within the property of Bayt al-mal.
Accordingly, to validly endow these lands, the most common way to acquire their property, in
addition to reviving them after being mawat, is the purchase from Bayt al-mal, or endowment by
the Sultan for a public benefit, in the view of the minority of Hanafi scholars of the Mamluk
period.
Shafi‘i scholars validated endowments of Bayt al-mal property, Hanafi scholars found
another solution: Purchase from Bayt al-mal.

Practical Response: Sale of the lands of Bayt-al-mal.
It is clear that the fatawa of many of the religious scholars in Mamluk Egypt agreed that
an endower must be the owner of the endowed property. Accordingly, endowments of an iqta‘
granting only usufruct rights are not valid. Endowments of the lands owned by Bayt al-mal,
except by Sultans for a public interest, are not also valid, unless bought from Bayt al-mal.
A practical reaction to these views was to seek to appropriate iqta‘ lands and endowing
them subsequently. Daisuke Igarashi showed that many iqta‘ holders transformed their iqta‘ into
rizqa by the Sultan’s permission. This allowed their descendants to inherit the iqta‘ de facto, and
to transform it subsequently into endowment. 1
A second practical reaction to these views, was the increasing trend of purchase of
agricultural lands from Bayt al-Mal during the late Mamluk period and starting from the 15 th
century. This is attested by the deeds for the sale of the lands owned by Bayt al-mal and by some
waqf deeds which specify the origins of the endowed property, or were inscribed on the verso of
the sale documents.

1

Igarashi, “Land Tenure and Mamluk Waqf,” 13-14.
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Other endowments clearly mentioned that the endower, in these cases a Sultan, is
endowing directly lands owned by Bayt al-mal without purchasing them.
In his important study Tatawur al-hiaza al-zira’iyya fi misr zaman al-mamalik aljarakisa, ‘Imad Abu Ghazi showed that the sale of the lands owned by Bayt al-mal increased
significantly during the Circassian Mamluk period, and especially during the reign of Barsbay
(825-841/1422-1437), Qaytaby (872-901/1467-1496) and al-Ghuri (906/1501-922/1516). 1
Abu Ghazi stated that among the deeds of sale which survived, 11.5 % relate to the sale
of lands of Bayt al-mal, in addition to hundreds of references deeds of the sale of lands of Bayt
al-mal in other deeds, the original sale deeds, which he estimates at 530 deeds, being lost. 2 Abu
Ghazi concluded that, despite other eras witnessed the sale of Bayt al-mal property, deeds from
the Circassian Mamluk period exceeded in number all the deeds surviving from earlier periods. 3
This phenomenon increased during Mamluk era, to the extent that at the outset of the Ottoman
rule, half of the Egyptian agricultural land was purchased from Bayt al-mal. 4
It is also worth mentioning that most of the deeds studied by Abu Ghazi included a
reason for the purchase – to be in accordance with the religious scholars’s views, but which
turned out to be incorrect. The deeds included a statement that there was a need to fund military
campaigns.5 However, through detailed study of all military threats and military campaigns
prepared during the Circassian Mamluk period, Abu Ghazi showed that the two periods during
which the Mamluk state faced real military threats were the first and the last twenty years of the

1

Abu Ghazi, Tatawur al-Hyaza al-Zira’iyya, 20-22 and Adam Sabra, “The Rise of a New Class: Land Tenure on
Fifteenth-Century Egypt: A Review Article,” Mamluk Study Review 8.2 (2004): 203-210, 206.
2
Abu Ghazi, Tatawur al-Hyaza al-Zira’iyya, 13-14 and 16.
3
Abu Ghazi, Tatawur al-Hyaza al-Zira’iyya, 16, the oldest deed known in Egypt for the sale of Bayt al-mal
property was published by Claude Cahen, Yusuf Ragib and Mustafa Anwar Taher, “L’achat et le waqf d’un grand
domaine égyptien par le vizir fatimide Ṭalāīʿ b. Ruzzik,” Annales Islamologiques 14 (1978): 59-126.
4
Abu Ghazi, Tatawur al-Hyaza al-Zira’iyya, 105.
5
Ibid., 33.
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Circassian Mamluk era. Interestingly, the first twenty years witnessed the least number of sale of
Bayt al-mal property. Furthermore, Abu Ghazi noticed that during 47 years, many military
campaigns occurred without a single sale from Bayt al-mal, while in a period of ten years which
witnessed no combats, many transactions for the sale of Bayt al-mal property occurred. Finally,
the year which witnesses the largest number of sale deeds, i.e. 864/1459 only one military
campaign was funded.1 In addition, the price of the purchase was subsequently donated to the
buyer on the basis of a decree by the Sultan. This occurred during both Bahri and Circassian
Mamluk periods, but reached its maximum during al-Ghuri’s reign, which also witnessed the
highest number of sale of lands from Bayt al-mal. 2 Accordingly, the real reasons behind the sale
of Bayt al-mal property was not as stated in the purchase deeds: funding military campaigns.
Such reason was only included as a form to validate the deed and fulfil the required legal
conditions. The true reason for this increased sale trend seems to be the transformation of these
purchased lands into endowments.
According to Abu Ghazi, more than half of the lands purchased from Bayt al-mal were
subsequently transformed into endowments.3 This is confirmed by Adam Sabra’s review article
on land tenure in Egypt in the fifteenth century. Using al-Tuhfa al-Saniyya, Sabra compared the
status of Egypt’s agricultural lands in 777/1376 and 884/1480. While in 777/1376 the number of
villages containing endowments was 66, representing 3 % of the total number of villages, in
1480, this number increased to 885, representing 40,9 % of the total number of villages. 4 AlTuhfa mentioned many instances of lands which were first iqta‘ and then were transformed into
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Ibid., 61.
Ibid., 79-80 and 83.
3
Ibid., 106.
4
Sabra, “The Rise of a New Class,” 205. This also corresponds to the rise of the number of village including lands
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endowments. These transformations occurred, according to Sabra’s reading of Abu Ghazi, during
the reign of Barsbay and Qaytbay.1
Reflection in Deeds:
Some sale or endowment deeds can illustrate the reaction of the practice to the scholars’
views on the impossibility to endow legally a land granted as iqta‘.
In his Fihrist Watha’iq al-Qahira, Muhammad Muhammad Amin has published
important deeds relating to the sale of lands from Bayt al-mal’s property, which were
immediately converted into endowments following the sale.
For instance, a deed dated 22 Rabi I 868/ 3 January 1464 establishes the sale of a part of
land located in Nahiyat Abshan, in Gharbia from Bayt al-mal, by Sultan Khushqudum (r. 8651460/ 872-1467) to Amir Umar Ibn Dulat Bay al-Mahmoudi. The sale deed detailed the borders
of the property, mentioned that the price was delivered to Bayt al-mal, and this delivery had a
witness thereof. The reason for the sale was mentioned “for necessity”(darura), to prepare the
armies for fight.”2 At the back of the deed, annex to the sale is a “transfer deed” (Intiqal) of the
land to Sheikh Izz al-Din Ibn Muhamed Ibn Yusuf, dated 8 Safar 876/7 July 1471. A year later,
the same land was endowed on 30 Muharam 877/ 7 July 1472. 3
A second deed which illustrates the procedure related to a parcel of land located near Bab
Rashid in Alexandria from Bayt al-mal properties. The land was sold on behalf of Sultan
Qaytbay in 20 Rabi‘ II 879 / 2 September 1474 to al-Saifi Juqmaq al-Ishaqi, na’ib al-Saltana in
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Muhammad Muhammad Amin, Fihrist Watha’iq al-Qahira hatta Nihayat ‘Asr Salatin al-Mamalik (Cairo: IFAO,
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3
Amin, Fihrist, 380.
2

91

Alexandria.1 The sale deed detailed the borders of the property, included that the price was
delivered to Bayt al-mal and mentioned a witness for this delivery. The reason for the sale was
mentioned “for necessity” (darura) and interest (maslaha), to prepare the armies for fight. 2” In
this year, the Franks attacked Damietta and Alexandria and the Sultan prepared a maritime force
to fight them. In the same year, a military campaign was sent to fight the Arabs of Buhayra. 3
Only four months later, on 19 Sha‘ban 879/ 5 May 1474, the lands were transformed into
endowment, the endowment figuring in the documents annexed to the sale deed and mentioning
the same plot of land described in the sale deed. ()الوثيقة الهامشية.4
The endowment deed of Abu al-Mahasin Yusuf Ibn Taghribirdi (born in Cairo in
812/1409–10 and died in 874/1470), historian and author of al-Nujum al-Zahira, for the benefit
of his Turba, which also included a school and a mausoleum dated 14 Shaʿbān 870/1465
included a clear reference to purchase from Bayt al-mal. Ibn Taghribirdi endowed a share in
plots of lands located in Gharbiyya. The deed clearly included that these lands are part of his
property acquired “through legal purchase from Bayt al-mal according to the legal contract dated
19 Jumada II of the same year.” 5 The deed also mentions that the contract for sale was
confirmed by the Shafi’i deputy judge Abi Abullah Muhammad al-Sanhuri on 26 Jumada II 870.
It is thus clear that Shafi’i judges considered the sale of Bayt al-mal property to be legal. It is not
clear whether a purpose was mentioned for the sale in the sale deed. However, the endowment
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was made only two months after the date of the purchase, which suggests that the real purpose of
the purchase was to later endow the lands.
While in some cases, endowments deeds included the means according to which the
ownership of the endowed land was acquired, in other cases, the deeds remained silent on the issue.
This may suggest that these lands were endowed from Bayt al-Mal property. Regarding the
endowment of Barquq, for instance, Daisuke Igarashi noted that the deeds or other documents
other than the waqf deeds themselves show the means to acquire the ownership of only seventeen
properties out of twenty six assets constituting the waqf, which makes it in most cases “impossible
to know how or when Barquq acquired these properties.” 1 He concluded that Barquq converted
state owned lands as well as iqta‘ lands into his private ownership and endowed them. Most
agricultural lands figuring in Barquq’s endowment, according to Igarashi, were either the property
of the state or allocated as iqta‘. This is the reason why Igarashi believed that endowment deeds
were silent as to the mode of acquisition of these lands because they were diverted from the state’s
properties.2 Barquq also acquired properties that were already endowed through the process of
Istibdal.3
The silence of the deeds as to the means of acquisition of the endowed properties leaves
room to doubt about the legality of such acquisitions. This idea is confirmed by the fact that Faraj,
Barquq’s son who succeeded him as Sultan, did not inherit his father’s properties, which al-Bulqini
considered as part of the state’s treasury. 4 This shows that there was an understanding, even among
religious scholars, that Barquq did not acquire these properties legally.
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Despite these clear efforts to amass private property, Igarashi considered that Barquq’s
intent in making these endowments was to place the lands he endowed under the state’s control
after his death.1
Other endowments clearly indicated that the endowed property was that of Bayt al-mal.
For instance, the endowment deed dated 25 Dhu al-Hijja 881/ 4 April 1477 made by Sultan
Qaytbay to establish the madrassa al-Ashrafiyya in Damietta. 2 The deed included the
endowment of portions of many agricultural lands in Upper Egypt, like plots of lands located in
al-Ashmunin (especially in Biblaw, Banub) and in Lower Egypt, like many plots of lands located
in in Bahnasa and lands near Damietta.3 These lands were the property of Bayt al-mal, which is
clearly articulated in the deed, and justified by the fact that the foundation is established for the
support of a mosque (masjid jami‘) and the school, which is a purpose within the “general
interest of the Muslims”.4 This wording is to satisfy the legal requirement, added by the Shafi‘i
scholars of the Mamluk period to validate the endowment of Bayt al-mal properties by the
rulers.5
Conclusion:
While the endowment of a land necessitated it to be owned by the endower, a number of
Mamluk religious scholars validated endowments from Bayt al-mal for the public welfare, and
requalified them into Irsad. Others prohibited endowments of state-owned lands. The reaction
was either to appropriate illegally iqta‘ lands, or to purchase lands from Bayt al-mal in order to
endow them.
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Chapter IV
Istibdal of Endowment of Agricultural Lands

The expansion of endowme5nts of agricultural lands during the Mamluk period led to
two major problems: One the one hand, it blocked the lands, without possible sale or future
endowment. On the other hand, endowed lands could have become unprofitable: replacing them
with a better one was the only option to secure the revenues of the endowments. To ensure the
re-investment of the endowed lands or their replacement with better ones, the ruling elite revived
an old, but rarely used, mechanism: the Istibdal. 1
Istibdal or exchange of endowments is defined as “the sale of an endowed property in
order to purchase another one to endow it in its place.” 2 This notion of “sale and replace” of the
endowment, was known since the early Islamic periods,3 and it re-emerged in the Mamluk era.
The application of this mechanism and the views of the jurists issued about it during the
Mamluk era illustrate in a very clear way the legal development through the maneuvering of and
selection from existing opinions within the same school of law rather than the invention of
completely new ideas. In some instances, scholars selected the view of an earlier scholar
amongst many other views to declare that Istibdal is prohibited in their madhhab. In other
instances, they acknowledged earlier opinions which allowed Istibdal, while at the same time
they refused to comply with them for fear of abuse.
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In spite of the controversy among jurists about the legality of certain types of Istibdal,
this mechanism became abundantly used by qadis who, when approached on this matter, in many
cases, allowed the Istibdal. Jurists from different schools as well as jurists from the same school
expressed different views on Istibdal. This diversity is a reflection of a real problem with
multiple aspects. As discussed previously, jurists depended on endowments for their revenues.
Accordingly, their attitude towards Istibdal is not very different from their attitudes when it came
to legalizing the (Irsad). In the case of Istibdal, however, other factors came to the picture. This
has to do with the effect of Istibdal and more specifically in the perpetuity required by waqf.
Perpetuity was understood by some jurists as a freezing of property. It was understood by other
jurists in a different way: namely, how to perpetuate the revenues produced by the waqf. This is
why it is justified to present in the following sections samples of these diversities, to show the
tensions between these two understandings.
In addition to their own interests to preserve endowments to secure their revenues, power
and political pressure played an important role in shaping the positions of some scholars on
Istibdal. While some scholars rejected Istibdal because of the fear that Istibdal would lead to the
dissolution of endowments, other scholars found legal basis to operate Istibdal during the
Mamluk era. These positions show that Islamic law developed as a response to social reality, 1
interests, and political pressure.
Cases of exchange reported by chronicles were based on different schools of law, which
shows that despite the primacy of the Shafi‘i chief justice in many aspects, the existence of four
chief justices of the four schools allowed flexibility and maneuverability in the legal and judicial
system.2 Sultans and the Mamluk elite sought the judge or the religious scholar who will use the
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opinions of his school to better serve their interests. The reliance on the Hanabli school in
instances of Istibdal during the Bahri period, as I will examine later, is a demonstration of this
“legal shopping”.
This “legal shopping” (i.e choosing among a number of legal instruments to apply the
one that serves a specific purpose) also came within the context of the fifteenth century in which
international trade was in crisis. The state sought to monopolize trade in certain, if not all,
important commodities to realize profits and increase financial resources. One can assume that
agricultural lands were no exception to this trend, especially with the rising trend towards sale
from Bayt al-mal during the fifteenth century. Lands blocked through endowments needed to be
“freed” in order to recover the possibility to be sold or to re-endowed. It would also allow the
return of the exchanged lands to the market and the possibility to trade in these lands as
commodities,1 through their re-sale as milk or their re-endowment. The use of Istibdal as a legal
mechanism to achieve these goals shows the development of the law through the “revival” and
the use of an old ignored mechanism. It also demonstrates the “penetration” of economic notions
into religious institutions and mechanism (i.e. into non commercial or non economic structures). 2
This chapter seeks to explore the legal basis of Istibdal during the Mamluk period. It will
study the opinions of jurists and judges who accepted and rejected the operation of Istibdal and
their arguments. It will also attempt to trace the legal development of the Istibdal and its
relationship with the practice during the Mamluk era. It will show the influence of power to
shape or to violate the law.
1

Muhammad Afifi, Al-Awqaf wa-l Haya al-Iqtisadiyya Fi Misr fi-l ‘Asr al-‘Uthmani (Cairo: al-Hay’a al-Misriyya
al-‘Amma lil Kitab, 1991), 199-200.
2
On the notion and manifestation of the penetration of commercial and financial relationships into non-commercial
structures, See: Nelly Hanna, Ottoman Egypt and the Emergence of the Modern World: 1500-1800 (Cairo: AUC
Press, 2014), 19-20. This idea, applied to the Ottoman era, can also be applied to the Mamluk period that witnessed
“extensive commercial networks long before 1600”, See: Nelly Hanna, Artisans Entrepreneurs in Cairo and Early
Modern Capitalism: 1600-1800 (Cairo: AUC Press, 2011), 22.
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Since the majority of instances of Istibdal were decided by Hanafi and Hanbali judges,
their views will be studied in order to better understand and analyze the positions of judges and
jurists belonging to these schools. Shafi‘i school will also be studied as an example for almost a
complete rejection of Istibdal.

To Exchange or Not to Exchange? The Use of Madhhabs and the Influence of Power:
Chronicles cited many cases of Istibdal during the Bahri period. Most of them relate to
urban property, especially houses, bathes and lands in urban areas to build mosques. It was a
period during which the city of Cairo was expanding and it consequently became difficult to find
spaces for new constructions. Istibdal was an answer to the problem. 1 One can assume that
Istibdal was used for lands following the Bahri period, since that endowments of lands only
increased towards its end, as mentioned earlier.
Cases of recourse to Hanafi judges to operate the Istibdal were not always successful.
Some of them refused the exchange. Most of the judges who operated the Istibdal during the
Bahri period belonged to the Hanbali school, based on the Hanbali theory that will be discussed
in the following sections.
For instance, in 710/1310, al-Nasir Muhammad, who made use of the exchange to
establish large urban projects,2 obtained a decision from the Hanafi judge Siraj al-Din to
exchange a piece of land in Birkat al-fil which was included in the endowments of Sultan
Baybars. Al-Nasir Muhammad had previously attempted to have a decision allowing the

1
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Fernandes, “Istibdal: The Game of Exchange,” 205.
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exchange from the previous Hanafi judge, Shams al-Din al-Hariri. However, the latter refused
the exchange, and al-Nasir Muhammad removed him from office. 1
Based on the Hanbali school, al-Nasir Muhammad was also able to get decisions to
exchange two plots of land in order to build a mosque and annexes to it in their place in
719/1319 and 721/1321.2 He also took over an endowed house (Dar al-Baybarsiyya) after
threatening the heirs of the endower and getting the judgement of the Hanbali judge Sharaf alDin al-Harani in 733/1332, who issued a decision to sell the house and exchange it following
hearing witnesses testifying on the value of the house.3
A second strategy used by powerful amirs to use Istibdal, other than recourse to a
different madhhab, was to get judicial decisions to exchange endowment through false testimony
that the building was in a bad condition and needed to be demolished. The famous case of the
Bath called Qital a-Sab‘ is one of the most striking examples. Amir Qusun succeeded, with the
help of the Hanbali judge in 730/1329, to obtain a testimony of many witnesses that the bath was
in a bad condition and needed to be demolished. One of the witnesses, however, refused to
testify, because he had just been to the bath on the same day and found that it did not need to be
demolished.4 It is not clear whether the endowment deed for this house included a condition
allowing Istibdal. Al-Maqrizi only mentioned that Istibdal occurred in spite of the signing of the
deed by 72 witnesses including prominent scholars and judges like Ibn Daqiq al-’Id and Taqi alDin Ibn Bint al-A‘az.5 This means that the endower sought to protect his deed from invalidation
by future judges.
1

Al-Khuli, Al-Istibdal wa Ightiṣab al-Awqaf, 45, al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, 2: 82. Al-Hariri’s grounds for rejection will
be studied in details in the following sections.
2
Al-Khuli, Al-Istibdal wa Ightiṣab al-Awqaf, 45-46, al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, 2: 102 and 216. Al-Maqrizi did not
mention the name of the judges or Ulama involved in these transactions.
3
Al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, 2: 362, Al-Khuli, Al-Istibdal wa Ightiṣab al-Awqaf, 46-47.
4
Al-Khuli, Al-Istibdal wa Ightisab al-Awqaf, 46.
5
Al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, 2: 362.
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Moving to Circassian Mamluk era, al-Mu’ayad had also exchanged urban properties to
enlarge his mosque and madrassa, while no details were mentioned as to the judges who took the
decision to sell, buy or exchange. Similarly, the process of exchange itself is not mentioned in
details.1
Pressure from the ruling elite also influenced the positions of judges on exchange. 2
For instance, the Hanafi chief justice Shams al-Din al-Amshati refused to appoint a
deputy judge to operate dissolution and Istibdal of endowments when Qaytbay invited him to do
so in 877/1472. Al-Amshati was known for his opposition to the dissolution and exchange of
endowments. He served as deputy judge for a number of years, and was appointed chief justice.
During his judgeship, he was also the Shaykh of the madrassa Barquqiyya. 3 Al-Amshati rejected
Qaytabay’s proposal because he did not wish “to meet God while he contributed to a dissolution
of and endowment or to an exchange.” Al-Amshati stated clearly that the Sultan had the
authority to give deputy judges the power to exchange and dissolve endowments. However, he,
i.e. al-Amshati, will not agree to dissolve or exchange any endowment. 4 However, Ibn Iyas
reported that al-Amshati allowed an exchange of urban properties under pressure of Amir
Yashbak in 879/1474, and he was publicly criticized for this decision. 5 Yashbak was the most
powerful amir during Qaytbay’s reign and held many key positions in the state. 6 Al-Amshati
operated exchange under Yashbak’s pressure that he could not resist. His opposition to
Qaytbay’s suggestion may be different, because Qaytbay did not wish him to decide on a specific
case of exchange and probably did not force him to change his position. Yashbak, on the
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contrary, wished to appropriate a specific property in Bulaq and, according to Ibn Iyas, has truly
exercised pressure to force al-Amshati to approve the exchange. 1
There seems to be an expansion in the use of Istibdal in the later period. Similarly to the
deeds of sale of the property of Bayt al-mal, the amount of available exchange deeds increased
significantly towards the end of the Mamluk era and in the period immediately preceding the
Ottoman conquest.2 Al-Ghuri exchanged a large number of endowed lands to take them over. He
was helped by a number of judges and agents acquiring the lands and then selling them to him,
especially, the Hanafi judge ’Abd al-Barr Ibn al-Shihna. Al-Ghuri also manipulated the system
by providing false testimonies that the endowment’s condition was depreciating. 3
It is doubtful that this large number of endowed property subject of exchange was truly in
a state of depreciation necessitating their exchange. The main reason for this massive exchange
and purchase movement was to increase al-Ghuri’s revenues and investment on the one hand,
and using the property to construct buildings (in urban properties). 4 One could therefore consider
that the increase in the use of this mechanism was part of a broader trend of market forces
penetrating the institution of Waqf.
It is within this context of political pressure on the ulamas and their own interests to
preserve endowments, that the views of the religious scholars of the Mamluk era will be studied
in the following paragraphs. The views of the scholars showed some confusion and
contradiction: While respecting the will of the endowers when they stipulated the possibility of
exchange of endowments, they disregarded this will when it prohibited exchange (Section I).

1

Ibn Iyas, Bada’i‘ al-Zuhur, 3: 87. In Ibn Iyas words:
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More debates and confusions occurred in the case where the endower did not include any
conditions related to Istibdal in the deed (section II).

I- Contradiction as to the Respect or the Disregard of the Endower’s Will:
Hanafi scholars agreed that an endower might validly stipulate that his endowment might
be exchanged. Early Hanafi jurists, held that a condition that the endower may sell the endowed
property invalidated the deed, because it is contrary to one important element of the endowment:
perpetuity.1 To be valid, such condition should provide that the sale will be followed by an
Istibdal. Taking a more flexible position, Abu Yusuf also validated an endowment including a
condition allowing the sale of the property: the condition alone should be null and void, the rest
of the deed remains valid.2 The condition may validly provide that exchange may be made by the
endower, the administrator during the endower’s lifetime or after his death. 3
Hanafi jurists during the Bahri Mamluk period, like Shams al-Din al-Hariri (653-1250/
728-1328), the Hanafi Chief Justice, and al-Tarsusi (721-758/1321-1357), also allowed a
condition in the endowment deed which allowed Istibdal.4
A new development occurred towards the end of the Circassian period: al-Tarabulsi
expressly allowed Istibdal of endowments of agricultural lands based on the endower’s
stipulation. Contrary to earlier scholars who gave examples of chapels, shops, houses and slaves
to operate Istibdal, al-Tarabulsi gave examples of exchange of agricultural lands in addition to

1

Al-Khassaf, Kitab Ahkam al-Awqaf, 21-22.
Ibid., 22.
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Shams al-Din Muhammad Al-Hariri, “Istibdal al-Waqf,” in Rasa’il ḥawl al-Waqf, ed. Muhammad Ibn Ibrahim
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urban properties. His view is based on the fact that “the endowment may be transferred from a
land to another land”, especially in the case where the productivity of the land was affected and
decreased, or if the land became uncultivable. For these reasons, the endower may beforehand
stipulate that the endowed land may be exchanged.1 Thus, as in the case of the legal status of
Egypt’s lands, rather than formulate new theories, Mamluk jurists picked and choose from
sections of older jurists the parts that suited them, and adapted them to the circumstances of their
times.
In sum, for the Hanafi school, Istibdal was possible based on the endower’s condition to
exchange.
Examples of provisions allowing Istibdal may be found in the endowment deed dated 25 Dhu
al-Hija 881/10 April 1477 made by Sultan Qaytbay to establish the madrassa al-Ashrafiyya in
Damietta, which included a large amount of agricultural lands, 2 where Qaytbay stipulated that it
is possible for him (the endower) to exchange the properties. 3
Despite the fact that jurists respected the will of an endower who allowed exchange in his
deed, the same will was disregarded by some jurists to allow an Istibdal that the endower has
prohibited.
Many deeds of the Bahri Mamluk period included a prohibition of Istibdal. For instance,
the endowment of al-Nasir Hassan on his mosque and madrassa in Cairo dated 15 Rabi al-Thani
760/16 March 1359, which included a large amount of agricultural lands and villages, prohibited
expressly the sale and the exchange of all or part of the endowed property. 4
1
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The endowment deed dated 27 Ramadan 757 /23 September 1356, made by Amir
Sarghamtash, Mamluk of al-Nasir Muhammad and powerful amir during the reign of al-Nasir
Hassan for the foundation of his madrassa, provided that the endowed property should not be
sold, or exchanged by another property or transferred to any individual. 1 Sarghatmash adopted
the Hanafi school and made it the legal school taught in his madrassa. 2 The endowment was
certified by Qadis of the four schools in various dates, including for instance, those who certified
it in the years 757 and 758, the Hanafi Qadi Jamal al-Din al-Mardini, the Shafi‘i ‘Iz al-Din
Muhammad Ibn Burhan Ibn Juma‘a, as well as the Hanbali judge al-Maqdisi, 3 which shows that
all the schools of law allow the prohibition of Istibdal by the endower’s will. The case where
such stipulation existed in an endowment was briefly discussed by jurists.
Some of the Hanafi jurists prohibited the exchange in this case, because it will be made in
violation of the endower’s express stipulation, while others allowed it by the judge’s permission
provided that this is in the interest of the endowment.
To continue his mediating positions, al-Tarabulsi dealt with the issue of contradictory
stipulations in the endowment deed. Accordingly, the latest stipulation prevails oven the earlier.
If the endower prohibited the sale and exchange at the beginning of the deed, then stipulated at
the end of the deed that the endowment may be exchanged, the later condition prevails. If the
opposite occurred, then exchange is not possible.4
Al-Tarsusi also examined the issue by stating that “as it is the practice in our countries”
that endowers prohibit the Istibdal in their deeds. This prohibition includes prohibition of sale
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and/or exchange.1 Al-Tarsusi referred to earlier Hanafi jurists and noted the divergence in their
positions: While Hilal’s view held Istibdal illegal in this case, Abu Yusuf took the view that
Istibdal is possible with the Qadi’s or the ruler’s decision in case of necessity, i.e. if the
endowment is deteriorated and generated no revenues. Al-Tarsusi believed that operating the
Istibdal here is legal, because it will be for the benefit of the beneficiaries. He added that he ruler
and the judge are in a better position to decide on the interest (maslaha) of the endowment and
its beneficiaries than the endower, who is not entitled to stipulate a condition that is contrary to
those interests.2 Accordingly, for al-Tarsusi, Istibdal is possible in violation of the stipulation of
the endower, if there is a necessity (darura) or if there is an interest (maslaha) for the
beneficiaries.
The Hanbali jurist and Ibn Taymiyya’s disciple Ibn Qayim al-Jawziyya (691/1292-7511350 ), also stated that a condition that is contrary to the benefit of the endowment and its
beneficiaries should not be respected. Without mentioning specifically the condition prohibiting
the Istibdal, Ibn Qayim al-Jawziyya criticized, in his book ‘A’lam al-Muwaq’in, the well known
rule that “the condition of the endower is similar to the Rule of God “Shart al-waqif ka nas alSahri‘,” because the endower’s condition should be disregarded or even annulled if it is contrary
to God’s rules or to the interests of the beneficiaries. 3
In sum, jurists of the Mamluk era allowed Istibdal in case of darura or maslaha, even if
the endower had expressly prohibited it in his deed. Examining their opinions in the previous
section and the extent of their fear of abuses in implementing Istibdal, one would expect that
they would prohibit Istibdal if the endower had prohibited it in its deed. However, notions of
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darura and maslaha were again used in order to justify the exchange. This mechanism would
allow them to benefit to the fullest extent from endowments made in their favour, since a
decrease in the endowments’ revenues will be remedied through the exchange relying on either
darura or maslaha. These views may be justified by the fact that they were issued in a context of
crisis and shortage of revenues of endowments. This shortage led them, for instance al-Suyuti, to
disregard the endower’s conditions related to the distribution of the revenues to the sheikhs of
madrassas and Sufi lodges, in order to secure more revenues for religious scholars. This time, the
endower’s stipulation was disregarded to ensure that the endowed property would always remain
in a position to generate sufficient revenues for them.
Furthermore, such opinions will help the ruling elite in the undertaking of Istibdal, even
when the endower prohibited it. The support of the ruling elite is thus guaranteed.

II-

Between Perpetuity of the Waqf and the Perpetuity of the Beneficiaries’
Interests: The Case of the Absence of a Condition in the Deed Allowing Istibdal:

The possibility for the judge to operate Istibdal despite the absence of a clear stipulation by
the endower allowing the exchange of the property was an issue that led to many debates
between jurists during the Mamluk period, even within the same school of law. The extent of
discussions between scholars related to this issue leads one to suggest that the case of the
absence of a stipulation in the deed to allow the exchange was much more common than the case
where the endower allowed Istibdal. The importance of exchanging the endowed property in the
absence of an express stipulation allowing it came from the fact that allowing exchange without
prior condition in the deed may pave the way to the sale and dissolution of endowments. It would
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also allow the return of the exchanged lands to the market and the possibility to trade in these
lands as commodities,1 or their return under the state’s control to sell them from Bayt al-mal.
I will now examine the position of the different schools of law on Istibdal in the absence of a
stipulation which allowed exchange in the endowment deed. The study of different views of
jurists of different madhhabs is important in light of the use of the Mamluk elite of the flexibility
resulting from to the existence of four madhhabs in order to reach their goals to undertake the
Istibdal.
Hanafi school:
There is a divergence within the Hanafi school about the legality of Istibdal without
stipulation by the endower during the Mamluk period. This divergence is caused by the different
interpretations of earlier opinions within the school. Furthermore, the abuses of the Istibdal
process by the Mamluk ruling elite, and the fear that allowing Istibdal may ultimately lead to the
dissolution of endowments, influenced the position of the Hanafi scholars.
Before the Mamluk era, Al-Khassaf accepted to operate the exchange in the absence of a
stipulation by the endower in case the endowed property deteriorated. He took the view that if a
land deteriorated and became incapable of generating the revenues necessary to sustain the
foundation, the judge may decide to sell this land and purchase another plot of land –even
smaller- in order to pay the beneficiaries - and this is based on Istihsan.2
During the Bahri Mamluk period, and most probably during the third reign of al-Nasir
Muhammad (709-1309/741-1340) a debate occurred between Hanafi jurists as to the possibility
to undertake Istibdal. Al-Nasir Muhammad undertook many exchanges, including those of
properties which were part of Sultan al-Zahir Baybars’ endowments. However, the Hanafi judge
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Shams al-Din al-Hariri (653-1250/ 728-1328) refused to exchange properties, and was removed
from office by al-Nasir Muhammad.1 He later wrote a risala to explain his views on the position
of the Hanafi school regarding Istibdal.
Contrary to al-Khassaf’s views, al-Hariri interpreted the opinions of many Hanafi
scholars as prohibiting Istibdal unless the endower had stipulated it. In his understanding,
exchange is not legal, even if the endowed property was totally destroyed and became useless.
This is based on the premises that the purpose of the endowment is not the gain of profit or trade.
The core of the notion of endowment is the freezing of the endowed property to guarantee its
permanence and continuity, which leads to the prohibition of its sale. 2 Al-Hariri believed that
exchange is illegal in the views of all Hanafi jurists, except for one opinion attributed to Abu
Yusuf which allowed exchange.3 No one can claim, according to al-Hariri, that the majority of
Hanafi jurist allowed the Istibdal. He concluded that the majority opinion had more weight than
the minority one.
However, al-Hariri’s understanding of the views of earlier Hanafi jurists is not the only
reason for rejecting the exchange of endowments. He was also concerned about possible abuses
of the process. He stated in express terms that “allowing Istibdal would open the door to a
corruption that would lead to the dissolution of endowment”. 4
Sharing the same fear from abuses of the process, another Hanafi chief Justice in Cairo,
however, rejected al-Hariri’s view.
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This judge, Fakhr al-Sin Abu Umar Uthman Ibn Ibrahim Ibn Mustafa al-Mardini,
(650/1252- 731/1331) had a different position.1 Al-Mardini drafted a risala to reply to al-Hariri.
He took the view that the Istibdal is allowed in the Hanafi school in the absence of a condition
of the endower, if an interest existed to exchange the endowed property. He believed that both
Abu Yusuf and Muhammad al-Shaybani, allowed the exchange. While jurists rejecting Istibdal
based their opinion on that fact that endowments are not made for commerce, those scholars
allowed it in order to maintain the continuity of the revenues and ensure support for the
beneficiaries and the foundation supported by the endowed property.
When the endowed property is damaged or becomes useless, the permanence and the
continuity of the endowment require to sell it and buy another to replace it. Accordingly, it is
necessary to operate the Istibdal in case of interest (maslaha) because it leads to the continuity
of providing the endowment’s profits to its beneficiaries. This goal could only be achieved if the
Istibdal is allowed.2 Al-Mardini made references to Qadikhan who allowed expressly the
exchange of an endowed agricultural land if the land weakened and the administrator found
another land that has better production. In this case, the Qadi should decide in the Istibdal if he
deemed that an interest existed.3 Accordingly, al-Mardini believed that Istibdal is possible, even
if the endower did not stipulate it, in case there is an interest in the exchange.
However, al-Mardini did not approve the application of the Istibdal process, stressing that
he is against “opening the door to the exchange,” because it is a means to sell the endowed
properties. He stated clearly that he refused to accept it when he was sought to approve or
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decide on an exchange, because it is “a right used for the wrong”. 1 He might have been
influenced by the fact that al-Nasir Muhammad and some of his powerful amirs were making
abundant use of Istibdal to re-endow properties.
The practice of Istibdal in Egypt was also criticized by the Damascus judge, Najm al-Din
Ibrahim Ibn Ali Ibn Ahmad al-Tarsusi, (721-758/1321-1357), who lived during the third reign of
al-Nasir Muhammad, and died during the second reign of al-Nasir Hassan (755-1354/762-1360).
Al-Tarususi, like al-Mardini, believed that in the absence of a stipulation allowing
Istibdal in the deed, a judge may exchange the property if there is an interest (maslaha) in the
exchange. The examples of Istibdal he gave were examples for exchange of agricultural lands, 2
since their endowments started to increase since the era of al-Nasir Hassan, as previously
mentioned. However, the mere existence of a property generating more revenues than the
endowed property does not justify the exchange. This is based on Hilal’s opinion that the
endowment is not made for commerce or to generate revenues. Allowing the sale of endowments
without stipulation by the endower may lead to the future sale of the replacing property, which
may lead to “an endowment being sold every day”.3
However, al-Tarsusi criticized application of Istibdal in Egypt. He believed that the
exchange of endowment originated in the Hanafi school, but its application by Egyptian judges
varied. Some of them applied the doctrine correctly, while others applied it in the wrong way, by
selling properties in good status with low prices and then replacing them by others with less
revenues to please the rulers and to obtain prohibited gains and benefits from them. 4 He also

1

Ibid., 42.  فإﻧي وإن كنت أعﺘقد صحﺘه حين يﺘعطل الوقف أو يؤول إليه لو ترك على،"وإﻧي أشهد ﷲ تعالى أﻧني غير راض بفﺘح باب اﻻسﺘبدال
 وإﻧي..حاله لما فيه من إحيائه وإبقائه مع اسﺘمرار النفع للموقوف عليهم وتحصيل غرض الواقف أعلم أن هذا الحق يﺘوسلون به إلى الباطل فﺘباع اﻷوقاف
"لم أوافق عليه حين فوض إلي غير مرة
2
Al-Tarsusi, Al-Fatawa al-Tarsusiyya, 113.
3
Ibid., 112.
4
Ibid., 108-109. لينال بها سحﺘا مما في أيديهم
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criticized what some “ignorant judges” do. Instead of deciding or permitting the exchange
themselves, they only approve the exchange operated by the administrator of the endowment.
They approve exchanges of good lands and expensive houses in Damascus with amakin and
houses in Cairo that have no use and cannot be endowed. This is, in his view, contrary to Abu
Yusuf’s views and to all other Hanafi scholars’ opinions, even those who allowed the Istibdal
without condition of the endower. In al-Tarususi’s view, those exchanges should be invalidated
and the endowments should be reinstated. He described the proper means to exchange the
endowment: the Qadi should decide himself after receiving the opinion of two just witnesses
/experts that the place of the new property is better than the place of the original one, or that the
new one generates more revenues and is in a better status than the original one. Relying on the
expertise of these witnesses, the Qadi may decide to operate the exchange, and write his
permission in the endowment deed. However, al-Tarsusi preferred not to allow the Istibdal to
avoid abuses and loss of endowments. 1 Al-Tarsusi thus considered that the expansion of Istibdal
occurred because of the ignorance of the judges, without analysis for other possible reasons, like
being influenced by the amirs’ powers or attempting to obtain the support of the ruling elite,
especially in a period of political conflict such as the period of al-Nasir Hassan. While Istibdal
without stipulation is prohibited, the existence of a maslaha makes it possible. He did not set any
conditions or indications related to this maslaha. The broadness of this notion may ultimately
lead to opening the door to Istibdal, which is contrary to the result that al-Tarsusui is trying, at
least apparently, to prevent. It seems that his views were expressed to satisfy his own interests,
the views of his madhhab, and the interest of the ruling elite.

1

Ibid., 115.
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To conclude, it is important to note that the condition to operate Istibdal by the judge for
these scholars was the depreciation of the endowment. The focus on the prohibition to exchange
for the mere existence of a property generating more revenues is worth noting, because it might
be an attempt to avoid using Istibdal to sell the endowments or confiscate them. This prohibition
was also the reason behind false testimonies on the real condition of the endowed property.
Such fear from the dissolution of endowments led other Hanafi jurists to prohibit the
Istibdal totally in the absence of a condition by the endower, regardless of the status of the
property. For instance, Qassim Ibn Qutlubgha, joined al-Hariri in his view and refused exchange
in the absence of an express condition by the endower. He rejected the exchange if its purpose
was only to have a better property which generates more revenues. 1
Ibn Qutlubgha was issuing a fatwa related to the exchange of an endowed village to
replace it with a plot of land, which generated more revenue. It was later discovered that the
land’s revenues were better than the village. Ibn Kutlugha took the view that even if the land
generated more revenue, the exchange was not valid.2
Jurists towards the end of the Mamluk era, where Istibdal was used extensively by Sultans,
especially al-Ghuri,3 allowed the exchange in the absence of a stipulation by a decision from the
judge if he deems that there an interest (maslaha) in the exchange. In his book titled al-Is’af fi
Ahkam al-Awqaf, Burhan al-Din al-Tarabulsi, stated that an endower cannot exchange a property
if he had not stipulated the possibility of exchange, even if the land was completely destroyed and
fruitless, only the judge can.

1

Al-Tarsusi , Al-Fatawa al-Tarsusiyya, 112, Qassim ibn Qutlubgha, Rasa’il Ibn Qutlubgha al-Ḥanafi (Damascus:
Dar al-Nawadir, 2013), 595-596.
2
Ibn Qutlubgha, Rasa’il, 586.
3
Petry, Protectors or Praetorians?, 204.
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In reaction to the abuses of judges, al-Tarabulsi added some conditions related to the
judge who decided on the Istibdal. The judge undertaking the exchange should be a “Qadi of the
Heaven”, which means that the judge should be competent and have excellent religious
knowledge. He should also apply this knowledge when making his decisions. The notion of Qadi
of the Heaven is inspired from the Prophet’s Hadith that judges are divided into three groups,
two of them in Fire and one in Heaven. The Hadith was explained that the judge who will be in
Heaven is the one who has knowledge and decides according to it. This comment on the required
qualities and knowledge of the judge entitled to decide on exchange is important, in order to
avoid “invalidating the endowments of the Muslims as it is the case in our times.” 1 Describing
the knowledgeable judge who follows the rules of exchange as the “Qadi of the Heaven” is
significant, because it means, implicitly, that the judge who does not apply properly the rules of
exchange or abuses of the process of exchange will certainly be punished and will end in Hell.
Similar to al-Tarsusi, al-Tarabulsi’s position was a mediating one that sought to
accommodate his own interests and the views of his madhab, as well as those of the elite:
Prohibiting Istibdal without stipulation on the one hand, but allowing it under the pretext of a
maslaha on the other hand. Like al-Tarsusi, al-Tarabulsi considered the judges to be responsible
for the proper application of Istibdal. Judges are therefore responsible to prevent abuses, if they
wish to end in Heaven, not in Hell. An implied message that one may consider to be addressed to
‘Abd al-Barr ibn al-Shihna, the Hanafi chief justice, who used to facilitate the undertaking of
exchanges for al-Ghuri.2
Ibn Nujaym, mentioning specifically the case of agricultural lands, also rejected the
Istibdal without stipulation by the endower, even if the revenues of the endowed land decreased.

1
2

Al-Tarabulsi Al-Is‘af fi Ahkam al-Awqaf, 36.
Petry, Protectors or Praetorians?, 204.

113

Despite acknowledging that Abu Yusuf validated the exchange in this case, Ibn al-Nujaym cited
the opinions of other Hanafi scholars –prior to the Mamluk era, like al-Sarkhasi and Qadikhan.
His reading of the latter is that he prohibited the Istibdal without stipulation of the endower, even
if the land had become useless and had no productivity. Exchange for the mere existence of a
better property is not legal in his view. To conclude, Ibn Nujaym rejected the Istibdal in clear
terms. His rejection does not seem to be based on legal arguments, but rather on the
circumstances of the time: “We have seen endless corruption in the process of Istibdal, unfair
judges took it as a means to annul the majority of the endowments of the Muslims. 1”
To summarize, the opinions of the Hanafi scholars came as a clear reaction to the abuses
of the Istibdal process and to their interest to keep the endowments. Their practice was
sometimes different: they approved exchange under political pressure. Many of their scholars
(like al-Tarsusi and al-Tarabulsi) adopted a mediating position, allowing Istibdal if there is a
maslaha (that is not defined or limited), while declaring that the judges –not the muftis- are
responsible to prevent abuses.

The Shafi‘i School:
The Shafi‘i school was one of the most restrictive schools in allowing the exchange. The
majority of Shafi‘i jurists believed that an endowment that has depreciated should not be
exchanged. An endowment that was destroyed should be terminated, in the opinion of the
majority, its price should be then distributed to the persons with closed connection to the
endowment or to the poor.2

1

Ibn Nujaym, Al-Bahr al-Ra’iq, 345.
 فإن ظلمة القضاة جعلوه حيلة إلى إبطال أكثر أوقاف المسلمين وفعلوا ما، وقد شاهدﻧا في اﻻسﺘبدال من الفساد ما ﻻ يعد وﻻ يحصى،"وﻧحن ﻻ ﻧفﺘي به
."فعلوا
2
Al-Khuli, Al-Istibdal wa Ightiṣab al-Awqaf, 82-83.
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When discussing issues of Istibdal, Shafi‘i jurists during the Mamluk era did not clearly
deal with endowments of agricultural lands. The scarcity of fatwas expressly related to exchange
of agricultural lands may result from the scarcity of endowments of lands during the early Bahri
Mamluk period.
Al-Nawawi (d. 676/1277), for instance, gave the examples of trees which became
unproductive, as well as of endowed slaves. According to al-Nawawi, if the endowed property is
totally destroyed, (i.e. if the slave died, for instance) then the endowment terminates. If the
endowed property is not totally destroyed but was only damaged, there are two views. The first
view is that the endowment terminates. The second view, which is the better one in al-Nawawi’s
opinion, is that the endowment should not terminate. In this case, the endowed property should
be either sold and the price would be either given to the beneficiaries of the endowment, or to
used to purchase another property to be endowed instead of the first one, which means
exchanging the property that has been damaged. However, al-Nawawi did not prefer this view.
For Al-Nawawi, the better view is not to sell the endowment and to lease the parts that remain
from it, or transfer its property to the beneficiaries, depending on the use that can be made by the
remaining parts of the endowment.1
Al-Nawawi thus did not prefer the exchange. He preferred to terminate the endowment
that is completely destroyed, and to make the maximum use of the endowment that is only
damaged.
Al-Mahalli (791-864/ 1388-1459) adopted different views in Kanz al-Raghibin. A slave
who cannot perform the works required from him should be sold and exchanged by another one

1

Abu Zakariyya Yahia Ibn Ashraf Al-Nawawi, Rawdat al-Ṭalibin wa ’Umdat al-Muftin, 12 vols (Beirut: al-Maktab
al-Islami, 199), 5: 356, Jalal al-Din Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-Mahalli, Kanz al-Raghibin Sharh
Minhaj al-Talibin, 2 vols (Jedda: Dar al-Minhaj, 2013) 2: 96.
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to be endowed. An endowed tree that is damaged does not entail the termination of the
endowment, rather its remaining parts should be used to the maximum possible. A minor opinion
held that it should be sold and exchanged with another one. 1 Again, al-Mahalli did not mention
the example of agricultural lands.
Hanbali school: Ibn Taymiyya and the Maslaha Rajiha
Contrary to the Shafi‘i school , the Hanbali school was the most liberal in the issue of
Istibdal among the four schools of Islamic thought, since it provided for the easiest conditions
for the sale of endowments. Hanbali judges in Egypt allowed Istibdal during the reign of alNasir Muhammad (third reign from 709-1309/741-1340).
Hanbali scholars, however, did not adopt the same positions. Their majority took the
view that Istibdal is allowed in case of necessity (darura), i.e. if the revenues of the original
endowment decreased. In this case, the endowment may be exchanged to get a better one capable
of generating more revenues.2 One of the most important Hanbali jurists immediately preceding
the Mamluk era, Ibn Qudama (541 A.H- 620 A.H),3 required that the endowment becomes
useless to allow its sale. A simple decrease or an exchange to get a better property is not
sufficient to allow the exchange, since the principle is the prohibition of the sale of
endowments.4
Ibn Taymiyya (661-728/1263-1328) and his disciples however, had a different opinion,
showing the penetration of commercial and financial interests into the Waqf institution. They
allowed exchange for the existence of a preponderant interest “maslaha rajiha,” without
1

Al-Mahalli, Kanz al-Raghibin, 2: 102. Shafi‘i scholars dealt very briefly with the exchange, which they called
“sale and replacement of endowments” rather than exchange.
2
Abu Zahra, Muhadarat fi-l-Waqf , 159.
3
Born in Nablus (Palestine) and lived in Damascus.
4
Ahmad ibn Ḥassan ibn Qadi al-Jabal, “Al-Munaqala wa-l-istibdal bi-l Awqaf wa-l Ifsah ‘amma Waqa‘u fi dhalika
min al-Khilaf,” in Majmou‘ fi-l-Munaqala wa-l Istibdal bi-l Awqaf, ed. Muhammad Sulayman al-’Ashqar (Beirut:
Mu’asasit al-Risala: 2001), 45-126, 81.
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requiring a decrease in the revenues or use of the endowed property. This led to debates within
the school that will be examined in the following paragraphs. Interestingly, Ibn Taymiyya seems
to write about the Istibdal to facilitate its conditions in a period where recourse to this
mechanism did not expand. However, al-Nasir Muhammad, during whose reign Ibn Taymiyya
lived, sought to operate some exchanges. Ibn Taymiyya acknowledged that there is a debate
between scholars on whether it is possible to make an Istibdal to have a better property while the
originally endowed property is productive and not depreciated. He distinguished between two
scenarios. The first one is where the endowed property was damaged or depreciated. This is a
case of exchange for a need, and the property may be sold and its price used to buy a property to
replace it. The second scenario is where the endowed property is not depreciated, but there is an
interest to exchange it with another one. Accordingly, properties endowed to generate revenues,
like houses, shops, cultivated lands or villages, may be all exchanged against other properties
that generate more revenues, which is in the benefit of the endowment (i.e. beneficiaries). Ibn
Taymiyya believed that this is the opinion of Ibn Hanbal, who is very liberal when compared to
other schools, which only allowed the exchange in case of complete destruction of the endowed
property.1 Clearly, Ibn Taymiyya agreed to the exchange of agricultural lands in presence of
other lands that would generate more revenues. One may assume that the reason behind this
opinion is to ensure the continuity of the revenues to beneficiaries of endowments, and to allow
the endowed property to be traded again in the market. 2

1

Taqi al-Din Ahmed ibn Taymiyya, Majmou‘at al-Fatawa, 37 vols (al-Mansura: Dar al-wafa’ lil Tiba‘a wa-l Nashr,
2005) 31: 140.
2 It is unlikely that Ibn Taymiyya was attempting to gain al-Nasir Muhammad support, since he is known for his
opposition to the rulers and was imprisoned many times for issuing fatwas that were contrary to the desires of the
ruling elite.
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Ibn Taymiyya’s disciple, Qadi al-Jabal (693-771/1293-1369), who was born and lived in
Damascus and was appointed as Hanabali judge in 767/1365, wrote a risala on the matter.1
Ibn Qadi al-Jabal asserted that the Hanbali school’s position is to allow the exchange in
case there is a preponderant interest maslaha rajiha for the endowment and the beneficiaries. He
believed that this is also the position of the Hanafi jurist Abu Yusuf. 2
Ibn Qadi al-Jabal explained that the Hanabali school allowed the change and exchange of
endowment, depending on the maslaha rajiha lil waqf wa ahlili. The evidence is that Ibn Hanbal
allowed the transfer of a mosque if there is predominant interest to transfer it.
He also allowed the exchange of endowments other than mosques if they became useless.
Ibn Qadi al-Jabal used an a fortiori argument: If Ibn Hanbal allowed the transfer of mosques to
other places, exchanging an endowment that generates revenues is thus legal. 3
This is based on the fact that Ibn Hanbal allowed transfer of mosques in spite of the
inalienable character of the mosque’s building and the impossibility to rent or use the mosque’s
building for purposes other than those of the mosques. A fortiori, if exchange of such sacred
building is allowed, the exchange of other endowed property should also be allowed. 4 [for the
simple fact of masaha rajiha]. Furthermore, and based on the same method, a mosque belong to
God or to the Muslim community in its entirety, while an endowed property, according to the
Hanbali school, belong to the beneficiaries of the endowment. The exchange and transfer of a
mosque is allowed, then, a fortiori, the exchange of an endowed generating-revenue property
should be legitimate.5

1

Ibn Qadi al-Jabal (693-771), born in Damascus in a family of scholars. He was a disciple of Ibn Taymiyya. He was
appointed Hanabali judge in Damascus in 767, following Al-Mirwadi.
2
Ibn Qadi al-Jabal, “Al-Munaqala wa-l-Istibdal,” 51.
3
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Ibn Qadi al-Jabal clarified that, in his view, Ibn Hanbal allowed transformation of the
mosque, when his opinion was sought on whether it was legal to build shops and fountains in a
mosque’s basement. This position means that Ibn Hanbal allowed that the mosque be
transformed into a different type of property. However, disciples of Ibn Hanbal diverged when
interpreting this position. Some of them took the view that he allowed the transformation and
exchange of endowments, while others opined that Ibn Hanbal’s view related to a mosque that is
yet to be constructed, not a mosque that it already built and endowed. Ibn Qadi al-Jabal defended
the first view, because it is clear that the fatwa related to an already built and existing mosque
and the fatwa related to change the use of its basement. 1
Ibn Qadi al-Jabal refuted the opinions of scholars from the Hanbali school that took the
view that it was impossible to transfer the mosque unless it became useless. To defend his view,
Ibn Qadi al-Jabal reinterpreted an incident relied upon by the other group rejecting Istibdal for
the existence of a better property. The incident related to the Mosque of Kufa, which was
transferred to another place following the orders of the Caliphe Umar Ibn al-Khattab. Ibn Qadi
al-Jabal believed that the Kufa mosque had not deteriorated, but that the interest was to transfer it
to a different place.2
Therefore, a mosque may be moved to another place –thus exchanged- because it became
narrow for its users, despite that the mosque itself is not deteriorated and its utilities are the
same. Also, an endowed land may be sold and exchanged for maslaha, if the responsible for the
endowment were not able to take in charge ضعف أهل الوقف عن القيام بمصلحﺘه, because this is for the
best interest of the endowment. Their inability to maintain the endowment would lead to the
decrease of its revenues, which means that the best interest is to exchange it with another one

1
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that they are able to maintain.1 Accordingly, a simple “fear” that the revenues of the endowment
may decrease, or that a building will be damaged or deteriorated, justify its sale and exchange.
Only the sale of the endowed property without purchasing a replacement is prohibited. 2
The divergence between the Hanbali jurists is illustrated by a case where the Damascene
judge, Jamal al-Din Uusf al-Mirwadi refused to enforce an Istibdal because he thought it was
contrary to the Hanbali school opinion. The three other judges enforced the exchange –despite in
principle contrary to the position of their schools. Discussions occurred between the jurists of the
Hanbali school, and al-Mirwadi wrote a risala on the issue where he rejected Ibn Taymiyya’s
liberal views in the issue.
Al-Mirwadi’s risala responded to Ibn Qadi al-Jabal and refuted, very briefly, his
arguments which allowed the exchange of an endowment in good condition. His main argument
was that Ibn Hanbal and his disciples did not allow the exchange of an endowment in good
condition. Ibn Qadi al-Jabal misinterpreted the instances and sayings of Ibn Hanbal which he
relied upon and neglected other opinions of Ibn Hanbal. 3 Al-Mirwadi stressed that Ibn Taymiyya
did not mention all the sayings and opinions attributed to Ibn Hanbal because Ibn Taymiyya
knew that they do not establish properly the possibility of selling or exchanging endowments that
are not damaged or depreciated.4
To conclude, the Hanbali school allowed Istibdal under various justifications: necessity
(darura) or interest (malsaha rajiha).
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The case of Istibdal without condition by the endower led to many debates. Although of a
similar importance, but exchanging despite a prohibition of Istibdal by the endower received less
attention.
What about the endowment deeds?
According to al-Tarsusi, (721-758/1321-1357), who lived, like Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya,
during the last decades of the Bahri period, stated that it was the endowers’ practice to prohibit
Istibdal in their deeds.
Some deeds around this period included clear prohibitions to exchange, like the
endowment deed of al-Nasir Hassan made dated 760/1359, 1 and the deed of Amir Sarghamtash
made in 757/1356.2 Other deeds included general terms prohibiting dissolution, exchange and
transformation of the endowment. The deeds’ stipulations warned any person who might get
involved in such actions of God’s punishment. Examples of the latest deeds include the
endowment deed of al-Nasir Muhammad dated 10 Jumada al-Thani 724/ 5 May 1324. 3 Earlier
endowment deeds only included terms prohibiting dissolution and annulment of the endowments
and threatening of God’s punishment those who will attempt to dissolve the endowments. The
general terms of these stipulations, which include a prohibition of “dissolution, rescission or
transformation of the endowment” could indicate that Istibdal was among the prohibited actions,
since exchange leads to the transformation of the endowment. The deed of the endowment of al-
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Amin, "Wathaʾiq Waqf al-Sultan al-Nasir Hassan," in Tadhkirat al-Nabih, 3: 367 and the prohibition of sale and
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Mansur Qalawun dated 12 Saffar 685/ 4 April 1286 is an example for the latest stipulations,
since it included a condition prohibiting any person including, expressly, Sultans, amirs and
judges, from dissolving the endowment or transforming it.1
The Circassian period witnessed more flexibility in the positions of endowers, who
included express provisions in their deed to allow Istibdal. This shift comes in conformity with
Carl Petry’s analysis of endowments during Circassian period, especially during the reign of
Qaytbay and al-Ghuri, that endowments were made as means of investment and aimed at gaining
profits.
For instance, the endowment deed made by Sultan Qaytbay on 25 Dhu al-Hijja 881/ 4
April 1477 to establish the madrassa al-Ashrafiyya in Damietta 2 included a condition expressly
allowing Istibdal,3 as well as a condition in general terms, shorter, however, than the deed of alMansur Qalawun, prohibiting the annulment and the transformation of the endowment. 4 This
stipulation allowing Istibdal in Qaytbay’s deed would ultimately lead, according to the opinion
of almost all schools, to the possibility to exchange the endowment if a better property
generating more revenues could replace it.
Carl Petry’s view that waqf was used as an investment finds support in the deeds that allow
Istibdal as well as in legal opinions allowing Istibdal even when not stipulated or prohibited in the
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“ "فﻼ يحل ﻷحد يؤمن با واليوم اﻵخر ويعلم أﻧه إلى ربه الكريم صائر أن يغير هذا الوقف وﻻ شيا منه وﻻ يبطله وﻻ شيا منه فمن فعل ذلك أو شيا منه
"...فا تع الى طليبه وحسيبه يوم الﺘناد يوم عطش اﻷكباد
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deed of endowment. This ultimately allowed the sale and resale of the endowed property and its
replacement with other generating more profits, thus adding to the sultans already existing
endowments. To facilitate this investment, the Mamluk elite had recourse to the legal school which
allowed the operation of Istibdal. The appointment of four qudat al-qudat also facilitated exchange
since it provided flexibility allowing the Mamluk elite to achieve, in many cases, the results they
sought.
Furthermore, the use of exchange resulted in the return of the lands to the market and the
future possibility to trade in these lands as commodities,1 through their re-sale as milk or by bayt
al-mal. The use of Istibdal as a legal mechanism to achieve these goals shows the development of
the law through the “revival” and the use of an old ignored mechanism.

1

Muhammad Afifi, Al-Awqaf wa-l Haya al-Iqtisadiyya, 199-200.
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Conclusion

In this research, I attempted to discuss an important phenomenon during the Mamluk era:
the expansion of endowments of agricultural lands. This expansion raised many issues. Many of
them were dealt with in different writings, while the legal basis of such endowments, and their
legal consequences, received less attention.
The study of the legal basis and the legal treatment of endowment of agricultural lands
during the Mamluk period revealed a development, almost a change in the law. These
developments were not always made through finding innovative solutions or new theories. Old
concepts, notions and theories were constantly selected, adapted and even revived to allow
establishment and exchange of endowment of agricultural lands.
As I showed throughout the research, religious scholars of the Mamluk era had to
determine the legal status of the lands of Egypt. To operate a change, Hanafi jurists did not adopt
their own school’s earlier theories about the private ownership of Egypt’s lands. They decided
that these lands reverted to the state after the death of their holders, who owned them privately
following the Islamic conquest. Those lands could therefore be distributed as iqta‘ granting only
usufruct rights, or sold from Bayt al-mal to be subsequently endowed. The practice interacted
with these views, since the sale of Bayt al-mal lands increased significantly during the Circassian
period.
Shafi‘i scholars, on the contrary, took the view that the lands were an endowment (waqf)
for the benefit of the Muslims since their conquest. To validate the endowments by the rulers of
the lands owned by Bayt al-mal, they forged the notion of Irsad by using many techniques, like
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the selection from earlier views within their school, rejecting some of these views and adopting
other.
The legal treatment of endowments of agricultural lands also witnessed the use of
mechanism of development. The notion of Istibdal, which was discussed by very early religious
scholars, was revived and used extensively during the Mamluk era, through the notion, forged by
the Hanbali scholars, of maslaha rajiha.
These developments of the law of endowments were closely connected to the surrounding
economic and social circumstances.
First, the place of the ulama, including judges and scholars, as a social group, their
complex relationship with the ruling elite, and their dependence on the revenues that
endowments generated, influenced their views on endowments and had an impact on the
development of the law. The ulama were affected by the scarcity of resources and sought to
benefit from endowments, either as their supervisors (judges) or as beneficiaries (Sheikhs in
madrassas). Their extensive discussions about the legality of endowments of lands owned by
Bayt al-mal and the legality for them to benefit of these endowments, showed clearly the
interaction between their own interests and those of the ruling elite, that sought either to endow
more lands or to dissolve existing endowments to regain control over the lands and increase state
resources. The existence of families of scholars and judges also showed the necessity to keep a
good relationship with the ruling elite to secure appointments in judgeship and professorship
positions, not only for the concerned scholar, but also for his descendants. Views of the scholars
and judges were certainly affected by their complex position and their interest as a social group.
Second, the expansion of endowments of agricultural lands and the scholars’ views
allowing their establishment and their exchange came within a difficult economic context.
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Accounts of economic crisis during the fifteenth century affirm that the Mamluk state suffered
from scarcity of resources generated from international trade and manufacturing. Among the
various techniques used to overcome this crisis was the endowment of agricultural lands to
benefit from the surplus generated from the difference between revenues and expenses.
Dissolution and exchange of endowments of lands were also used to benefit from the lands by
distributing them as iqta‘ or re-endowing them for the benefit of the rulers.
However, accounts related to the economic crisis during the fifteenth century also affirm
that there was a crisis in agricultural production. The deterioration of the irrigation networks and
the depopulation following the Black Death were reported to have caused a decline of lands’
productivity and a decrease in the revenues generated by agricultural lands. This decline is in
contradiction with the trend towards appropriation of lands and waqfization of state’s agricultural
lands. Some views attempted to explain this paradox. However, I suggest that this decline in
productivity is not accurate and probably exaggerated, especially that it is very difficult to
calculate the amount of the revenues generated by agricultural lands accurately. I also suggest
that the calculation of the lands’ ‘ibra by Ibn al-Jay‘an in al-Tuhfa al-Saniyya is not entirely
accurate. This is further affirmed by what was noticed by Poliak, that al-Tuhfa only made
reference to decrease in the lands’ revenues rather than increase, because the muqta‘-s concealed
any increase in the revenues of their lands for fear that the Sultan would take it back and reduce
their iqta‘s.1
Accordingly, there are doubts as to the accuracy and the extent of this crisis in
agriculture. Future studies may further explore this issue. Their results will certainly help in the

1

Poliak, Feudalism in Egypt, 23. Poliak noticed that many lands granted as iqta‘-s were mentioned with the note
“without ‘ibra”, see for instance, Ibn al-Jay‘an, Al-Tuhfa al-Saniyya, 65, line 16 and 80, line 17.
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understanding of the expansion of the endowments of agricultural lands during the Mamluk
period.
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